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SUMMARY
The objective of this thesis is to present a robust watermarking algorithm
for H.264 and to address challenges in compressed-domain video watermarking. To
embed a perceptually invisible watermark in highly compressed H.264 video, we use
a human visual model. We extend Watson’s human visual model developed for 8× 8
DCT block to the 4×4 block used in H.264. In addition, we use P-frames to increase
the watermark payload. The challenge in embedding the watermark in P-frames
is that the video bit rate can increase significantly. By using the structure of the
encoder, we significantly reduce the increase in video bit rate due to watermarking.
Our method also exploits both temporal and texture masking.
We build a theoretical framework for watermark detection using a likelihood ra-
tio test. This framework is used to develop two different video watermark detection
algorithms; one detects the watermark only from watermarked coefficients and one
detects the watermark from all the ac coefficients in the video. These algorithms can
be used in different video watermark detection applications where the detector knows
and does not know the precise location of watermarked coefficients. Both watermark
detection schemes obtain video watermark detection with controllable detection per-
formance. Furthermore, control of the detector’s performance lies completely with
the detector and does not place any burden on the watermark embedding system.
Therefore, if the video has been attacked, the detector can maintain the same de-
tection performance by using more frames to obtain its detection response. This is
not the case with images, since there is a limited number of coefficients that can be




The advent of digital television, the appearance of digital versatile disks (DVI), and
the transfer of video files over the internet demonstrate the importance of digital
video. Despite the success of MPEG-2 in the video coding industry, a new standard,
H.264, with higher compression efficiency, is poised to replace it. As H.264 digi-
tal video becomes more prevalent, the industry will need copyright protection and
authentication methods that are appropriate for it.
Since video signals are usually stored and distributed in a compressed format, it
is often impractical to first decode the video sequence, embed a watermark, and then
reencode it. An alternative approach is to embed the watermark in the compressed
domain, which produces a lower-complexity video watermarking algorithm. Unfortu-
nately, the large body of MPEG-2 video watermarking algorithms cannot be applied
directly to H.264 because of the differences in the standards.
The goal of this thesis is to present a robust watermarking algorithm for H.264 and
to address challenges in compressed-domain video watermarking. We give overviews
of H.264 and digital watermarking in Section 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. Section 1.3
presents the organization of this thesis.
1.1 H.264 Standard
As with previous standards, H.264 does not explicitly define an encoder/decoder
pair (codec), but defines the syntax of an encoded video bitstream and the method of
decoding this bitstream. With the exception of the deblocking filter, most of the basic
functional elements are present in the previous standards. The important differences
in H.264 occur in the details of each functional block. We review some of these
1
differences in the following subsections. More details can be found in [2, 45, 55, 73].
























Figure 1: H.264 encoder block diagram.
1.1.1 Intra-Prediction
Unlike previous standards in which there is no prediction in their I-frames, I-frames
of H.264 are predicted in an intra-prediction mode. Intra-prediction means that the
samples of a macroblock are predicted by using only information of already transmit-
ted macroblocks of the same frame. In H.264, two different types of intra-prediction,
intra 4× 4 and intra 16× 16, are possible for the prediction of the luminance compo-
nent Y. The intra 4×4 mode is based on predicting each 4×4 luma block separately
and is well suited for coding the detailed areas of the frame. The intra 16× 16 mode,
on the other hand, performs prediction of the whole 16 × 16 luma block and is more
suited for coding the smooth areas of the frame. There are nine different prediction
modes in the intra 4×4 mode. One is dc prediction where one value is used to predict
the whole 4 × 4 block. In addition to the dc prediction mode, there are eight other
prediction modes, each for a specific prediction direction. All possible directions are
shown in Figure 2. There are four different prediction modes for the intra 16 × 16:
vertical prediction, horizontal prediction, dc prediction, and plane prediction. These
2
prediction modes are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 2: 4 × 4 luma prediction modes.





Figure 3: 16 × 16 luma prediction modes.
1.1.2 Inter-Prediction
Inter-prediction creates a prediction model from one or more previously encoded video
frames or fields using block-based motion compensation. In previous standards, only
16 × 16 and 8 × 8 blocks are supported. However, in H.264, a range of block sizes
(16 × 16, 16 × 8, 8 × 16, and 8 × 8) are supported. For an 8 × 8 sub-macroblock,
one additional element specifies whether the corresponding 8 × 8 sub-macroblock is
further divided into partitions with block sizes of 8 × 4, 4 × 8, or 4 × 4.
Each partition or sub-macroblock partition in an inter-coded macroblock is pre-
dicted from an area of the same size in a reference picture. The offset between the
two areas (the motion vector) has quarter-sample resolution for the luma component
and one-eighth-sample resolution for the chroma components. The luma and chroma
samples at sub-sample positions do not exist and they are created using interpolation
3
from nearby samples.
In previous standards, B-pictures are pictures that are encoded using both past
and future pictures as references. The prediction is obtained by averaging the forward
and backward prediction signal. However, H.264 uses a linear combination with
arbitrary weights, regardless of the temporal direction. Furthermore, using H.264 it
is possible to use images containing B-slices as reference images for further prediction,
which was not possible in previous standards.
1.1.3 Transform Coding
Similar to previous standards, H.264 uses transform coding of the prediction residuals.
Previous standards such as MPEG1 and MPEG2 apply an 8 × 8 two-dimensional
discrete cosine transform (DCT). However, in H.264, an integer transform is applied
to 4 × 4 blocks. H.264 uses three different types of transforms. The first one is
applied to all 4 × 4 blocks of luminance and chrominance components of inter- or
intra-macroblocks. The second transform is a Hadamard transform for the 4×4 array
of luma dc coefficients of 16×16 intra-predicted macroblocks. The third transform is
also a Hadamard transform for the 2 × 2 array of chroma dc coefficients. H.264 also
has an option to use an 8 × 8 transform in addition to the 4 × 4 transform.
The H.264 4 × 4 integer transform is based on the DCT, but with several advan-
tages:
• It is an integer transform; thus, all the operations can be carried out using
integer arithmetic without loss of decoding accuracy. The core part of the
transform can be implemented using only additions and shifts.
• The mismatch between the encoder and decoder is avoided. This has been a
problem with the 8 × 8 DCT transform used in previous standards.




H.264 specifies two alternative methods of entropy coding: a low-complexity technique
based on context-adaptive variable length coding (CAVLC) and a more computa-
tionally demanding algorithm using context-based adaptive binary arithmetic coding
(CABAC). Both methods represent major improvements in terms of coding efficiency
compared to the statistical coding traditionally used in video coding standards.
1.1.5 In-Loop Deblocking Filter
The block-based structure of the H.264 architecture can cause severe blocking arti-
facts. H.264 defines an adaptive in-loop deblocking filter to reduce blocking distortion,
where the strength of the filtering is adjustable. When the filtering process is carried
out in the loop, the filtered image is used for motion-compensation prediction of fu-
ture frames. This can improve compression performance because the filtered image
is often a more faithful reproduction of the original frame than a blocky unfiltered
image.
1.2 Digital Watermarking
Digital watermarking is a technique used for protecting the intellectual property rights
of digital media owners. Watermarking embeds a signal into the data stream that is
imperceptible to the human observer, but can be detected by a watermark detector,
hence identifying the owner and possibly the customer to whom this copy was origi-
nally distributed. The watermark does not prevent a user from listening to, viewing,
examining, or manipulating the content. One advantage of embedding the protection
directly in the signal is that the protection cannot be removed without affecting the
signal quality. While cryptographic techniques protect the data from eavesdroppers
during transmission, digital watermarking was introduced to leave a mark in the sig-
nal to protect it after transmission. Thus, these two fields together provide complete
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protection of the digital data.
Watermarking is a special case of data hiding or steganography. Steganography is
the practice of encoding secret information in a communication channel in a manner
such that the existence of the information is concealed. Typically, in steganography,
the secret information contains all the values, and the communication channel used
to hide it is not of value itself. However, in digital watermarking, the secret message
(watermark) is of little or no value on its own, and the communication channel (digital
image and video) is of value.
1.2.1 Video Watermarking Applications
With the wide application of digital video, watermarking can add value to various
video applications. Video watermarking applications are presented extensively in [16].
Some of these applications are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Applications of video watermarking.
Application Purpose of the embedded watermark
Copy control Prevent unauthorized copying.
Broadcast monitoring Identify the video being broadcast and check usage.
Fingerprinting Trace back a malicious user.
Video authentication Insure that the original content has not been altered.
Copy protection Prove ownership.
Enhanced video coding Bring additional information e.g. for error correction.
Advertisement Verify the frequency of display of an advertisement.
Content ID and archive Add meta-data (e.g. owner, date, etc.) for archive.
1.2.2 Video Watermarking Requirements
When designing a watermarking algorithm, trade-offs exist among three parameters:
payload, fidelity, and robustness. Data payload is the number of bits that can be
embedded in the digital data, the fidelity is the degradation introduced into the
signal, and the robustness is the ability of the watermark to remain readable after
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innocent or malicious signal processing operations on the signal. These parameters
are conflicting, and they should be chosen to meet the requirements of the application.
When designing watermarking algorithms for video, there are additional conflict-
ing parameters, such as the need for low complexity and constant bit rate. In some
video applications, watermark embedding or detection needs to be performed in real
time. Thus, video watermarking algorithms should have low complexity. Because of
the large size of video files, they are usually stored and distributed in a compressed
format. Video watermarking algorithms should not increase the bit rate of the com-
pressed video.
1.2.3 Video Watermarking Attacks
There are many challenges when designing a video watermarking algorithm. Simple
signal processing enhancement techniques, such as gamma correction, sharpening,
and filtering, and geometric attacks, such as cropping, resampling, and rotation, alter
the performance of watermarking algorithms. Transcoding, which involve changing
the compression ratio to adapt to the storage capacity, converting the video format,
and chrominance resampling, are likely to remove the watermark. Spatial desynchro-
nization, such as changes in display formats (4/3, 16/9, and 2.11/1) and changes
of resolution (NTSC, PAL, and SECAM), and temporal desynchronization such as
frame rate modification may also affect watermark detection algorithms. Also, video
editing, such as the addition of a commercial into the middle of a movie, a transition
between scenes, and superimposition, such as picture-in-picture technology, subtitles
and logos, degrade the performance of watermarking algorithms.
A more serious problem with video or audio signals, which are long, is the possi-
bility of a self-collusion attack. A collusion attack is a very powerful attack for still
images. There are two types of collusion attacks. If the same watermark is embedded
in different data, the watermark data can be estimated from each occurrence and
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the average of those estimates will be a refined estimate. If different watermarks are
embedded in the same data, several users can collude by averaging their decoded
signals to reduce the strength of the watermark and possibly render it unreadable.
However, with video one video sequence is enough to remove the watermark. If the
same watermark is embedded in all the frames, the first type of collusion can be used
to remove the watermark from different scenes. If a different watermark is embedded
in each frame, the second type of collusion can be used to remove the watermark
from correlated scenes. Recognizing these possibilities, the watermarks inserted in
two video frames should be as similar as the two frames are.
1.2.4 Classifications of Watermarking Techniques
In terms of their robustness to attacks, watermarking techniques can be classified
as fragile, robust and semifragile. Fragile watermarks do not survive lossy transfor-
mations to the original host signal; their purpose is tamper detection of the original
signal. Placing the watermark information into the perceptually insignificant portions
of the data guarantees imperceptibility, but provides a fragile watermark. Robust wa-
termarks are used for security applications and copyright protection. The technical
challenge is to provide transparency and robustness, which are conflicting require-
ments. For a watermark to be robust, the watermarks should be embedded into the
significant portions of the data. Semifragile watermarks should be insensitive to some
common innocent transformations, such as compression, but should be sensitive to
image transformations that alter the information, such as replacing a portion of the
image. The challenge for semifragile watermarking from a signal processing perspec-
tive is to provide a watermark that can distinguish between information altering and
simple signal processing transformations.
Watermarking techniques are also classified as public and private. Public or blind
watermarking algorithms do not require the original image to detect the watermark.
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Public watermarks are typically used for applications requiring a robust watermark,
such as identifying the buyers to prevent illegal duplication and distribution. Pri-
vate or non-blind watermarking algorithms do require the original image to verify the
watermark. Private watermarks are necessary for some fragile watermarking applica-
tions, such as authentication and tamper detection.
In terms of the domain in which the watermark is inserted, watermarking tech-
niques can be classified as spatial-domain, transform-domain or compressed-domain
watermarking algorithms. We will expand on these algorithms below. An overview
of a large number of watermarking techniques in the different domains can be found
in [18].
1.2.4.1 Watermarking in the Spatial Domain
In spatial domain watermarking systems, the watermark is embedded directly in the
spatial domain (pixel domain). Many of the spatial watermarking techniques provide
simple and effective schemes for embedding an invisible watermark into an image,
but are less robust to common attacks. Watermarking schemes in the spatial domain
are in general less robust toward noise-like attacks, such as lossy JPEG compression.
However, a big advantage is that the watermark may easily be recovered if the image
has been cropped or translated. Here we summarize a small portion of the proposed
spatial domain methods. More details about these algorithms can be found in a review
paper by Hartung et al. [18]. The abundance of spatial-domain methods results from
their simplicity and efficiency.
Tanaka et al. introduced the idea of tagging images to secretly hide information
and assure ownership rights first in 1990 [64, 65]. Then, in 1993 Caronni [11] described
an overall system to track unauthorized image distribution. He proposed marking
images using spatial signal modulation and called the process tagging. A tag is a
square with a constant value proportional to the maximum image brightness within
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the square and decaying outside the border. A selected image area is tagged by
adding or subtracting the tag and a random, zero mean, noise pattern. In the same
year, Tirkel et al. recognized the importance of digital watermarking and possible
applications for image tagging, copyright enforcement, counterfeit protection, and
controlled access to image data [67]. In their approach, the watermark in the form of
anm-sequence-derived PN code is embedded in the least significant bit (LSB) plane of
the image data. This method is actually an extension to simple LSB coding schemes
in which the LSBs are replaced by the coding information. The idea of using m-
sequences and LSB addition was extended and improved by the authors through the
use of two-dimensional m-sequences, which resulted in more robust watermarks [68].
A modified version of the method was presented by Schyndel et al. in [70] explicitly
mentioning the term digital watermarking. About the same time Matsui and Tanaka
proposed several watermarking techniques [34]. Their first method is based on a
predictive coding scheme for gray scale images; their second method modifies the
ordered dithering scheme for binary pictures; and their third scheme embeds the
watermark in facsimile documents.
Since the above techniques were introduced, interest and research activities in
watermarking have increased significantly. In some recent work, Bender et al. pro-
posed two methods for data hiding [5]. In the first method, called “Patchwork,”
randomly selected pairs of pixels are used to hide 1 bit by increasing one pixel by
one and decreasing the other pixel by one. In the second approach, called “Texture
Block Coding,” the watermark is embedded by copying one image texture block to
another area in the image with a similar texture. To recover the watermark, the
autocorrelation function has to be computed. Pitas et al. proposed signature casting
on digital images [36, 48, 49], which is based on the same basic idea as the patch-
work algorithm proposed by Bender et al. in [5]. Langelaar et al. proposed an
improved version of this idea in [29, 30]. The image is tiled into square blocks with
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a size being a multiple of eight. A single bit is embedded by iteratively modifying a
pseudorandomly selected block. To increase the performance of spread-spectrum wa-
termarking in the spatial domain, Kutter et al. proposed a method which exclusively
works with the blue image component (in the RGB color space) to maximize the
watermark strength, while keeping visual artifacts minimal [27]. Extensions to this
method allow increased robustness and even watermark recovery after geometrical
attacks and printing-scanning [26]. Macq et al. introduced watermarking adapted
to the human visual system (HVS) using masking and modulation [14, 15]. In their
scheme, the watermark in the form of a spatially limited binary pattern is low-pass
filtered, frequency modulated, masked, and then added to the host image. Wolfgang
et al. proposed a watermarking technique to verify image authenticity [74, 75] based
on an approach similar to the m-sequence approach suggested by Schyndel et al. for
the one-dimensional case [70] and Tirkel et al. for the two-dimensional case [68].
Watermark embedding based on quantization has been proposed by Chen and
Wornell [12]. Their method is called quantized index modulation (QIM) and is based
on a set of N -dimensional quantizers. Maes et al. proposed modifying geometric
features of the image [32]. The method is based on a dense line pattern, generated
pseudorandomly and representing the watermark. Fractal image compression, an idea
similar to spatial domain watermarking, was first proposed in [53]. In fractal image
compression, the image is coded using the principles of iterated function systems and
self similarity [56]. A drawback of this technique is the slow speed caused by the
fractal compression scheme.
1.2.4.2 Watermarking in the Transform Domain
In transform domain watermarking systems, watermark insertion is done by trans-
forming the image into the frequency domain using a discrete Fourier transform
(DFT), full-image DCT, block-wise DCT, wavelet, Hadamard, Fourier-Mellin, or
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other transforms. It is often claimed that embedding in the transform domain is
advantageous in terms of visibility and security. It has been shown that for maxi-
mum robustness, watermarks should be embedded into the same spectral components
that the host data already populate. For images and videos, these are typically the
low frequencies. Designing watermarking algorithms in the transform domain is not
as simple as in the spatial domain. However, there are many block DCT-domain
algorithms, because this transform is used by many compression standards such as
JPEG, MPEG2, and H.263, and etc.
Efficient watermarking in the DCT domain was first introduced by Koch et al.
[10, 23, 24]. As in the JPEG compression scheme, the image is first divided into square
blocks of size 8×8 for which the DCT is computed. From a pseudorandomly selected
block, a pair of midfrequency coefficients is selected from 12 predetermined pairs.
To embed a bit, the coefficients are then modified such that the difference between
them is either positive or negative, depending on the bit value. Bors and Pitas [8, 9]
suggested a method that modifies DCT coefficients satisfying a block site selection
constraint. The image is first divided into blocks of size 8×8. Certain blocks are then
selected according to a Gaussian network classifier decision. The middle range fre-
quency DCT coefficients are then modified, using either a linear DCT constraint or a
circular DCT detection region, to convey the watermark information. Swanson et al.
[61, 62] suggested a DCT-domain watermarking technique, based on frequency mask-
ing of DCT blocks, which is similar to methods proposed by Smith and Comiskey [58].
Tao and Dickinson [66] introduced an adaptive DCT-domain watermarking technique
based on a regional perceptual classifier with assigned sensitivity indexes. Podilchuk
et al. [52, 51] introduced perceptual watermarking using the just noticeable difference
(JND) to determine an image-dependent watermark modulation mask. The water-
mark is embedded into selected coefficients in either the DCT or wavelet transform
domain. For DCT coefficients, the author suggests using a perceptual model defined
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by Watson, based on utilizing frequency and brightness sensitivity as well as local
contrast masking. This model provides image-dependent masking thresholds for each
8 × 8 DCT block. Piva et al. described another DCT-based method which exploits
the masking characteristics of the HVS [50].
Frequency-domain watermarking was first introduced by Boland et al. [7] and Cox
et al. [13], who independently developed perceptually adaptive methods based on
modulation. Cox et al. drew parallels between their technique and spread-spectrum
communication since the watermark is spread over a set of visually important fre-
quency components. The watermark consists of a sequence of numbers x = x1, ..., xn
with a given statistical distribution, such as a normal distribution N(0, 1) with zero
mean and variance one. The watermark is inserted into the image V to produce the
watermarked image V ′. Three techniques are proposed for watermark insertion, but
the one most commonly used is
v′i = vi(1 + αxi) (1)
where α determines the watermark strength and the vis are perceptually significant
spectral components. The scheme can be generalized by introducing multiple scaling
parameters αi to adapt to the different spectral components and thus reduce visual
artifacts. To verify the presence of the watermark, the similarity between the recov-
ered watermark, given by the difference between the original image and the possibly
tampered image, and the original watermark, is measured.
Ruanaidh et al. proposed watermarking by modification of the phase in the fre-
quency domain [43]. To embed a bit the phase of a selected coefficient of an N1 ×N2,
DFT is modified by adding a small δ. The phase must satisfy negative symmetry
for the watermarked image to be real, which leads to the additional modification.
In another publication, Ruanaidh et al. explicitly design a watermarking technique
invariant to translation, rotation, and scaling [44]. The method is a hybrid between
DFT and log-polar mapping. A variation of their idea based on the Radon transform
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was proposed by Wu et al. [78].
Embedding the watermark using a multiresolution decomposition has first been
proposed by Boland et al. [7]. As for schemes working in other transform domains,
the watermark is usually given by a pseudo-random 2-D pattern. Both the image and
watermark are decomposed using a 2-D wavelet transform, and in each subband of the
image a weighted version of the watermark is added. Watermark decoding is, as usual,
based on a normalized correlation between the estimate of the embedded watermark
and the watermark itself. Various wavelet-based schemes have been proposed [21, 25,
79, 81]. The differences between the schemes usually lie in the way the watermark is
weighted in order to decrease visual artifacts.
1.2.4.3 Compressed-Domain Video Watermarking
Since video signals are usually stored and distributed in a compressed format, it
is often impractical to first decode the video sequence, embed the watermark, and
then reencode it. Thus, designing low-complexity video watermarking algorithms
that embed the watermark in the compressed domain is attractive. Most of the
previous work on compressed-domain video watermarking focused on embedding the
watermark into the MPEG2 bitstream. The residual blocks in the MPEG2 standard
are compressed using the DCT transform, quantized, reordered, run-level coded, and
then variable length coding is applied.
Langelaar et al. proposed two real-time watermark embedding methods [28]. Both
methods embedded the watermark directly into the MPEG compressed bitstream.
The first method embedded the watermark by changing the variable length codes
(VLCs). The watermark is embedded by selecting suitable VLCs and forcing their
least-significant bits (LSB) to match the corresponding watermark bits. The second
method discarded some of the high-frequency DCT coefficients of the bitstream to
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embed the watermark. Hartung et al. proposed a method for embedding the water-
mark in the uncompressed video and an extension of that method for embedding the
watermark in the MPEG2 video [17]. The authors’ method, which is based on spread
spectrum watermarking [13], spread the watermark bits by a large factor called the
chip rate to obtain the spread sequence. The spread sequence is amplified with an
adjustable factor and is modulated by a binary pseudo-noise sequence and added to
the video signal. Alattar et al. proposed an MPEG4 compressed-domain video wa-
termarking method, and its performance is studied at low video bit rates [3]. This
approach is similar to the approach in [17]; however, the authors used a synchroniza-
tion template to combat geometric attacks. Their method also featured a gain control
algorithm that adjusts the embedding strength of the watermark, depending on local
image characteristics. Simitopoulos et al. proposed another compressed-domain video
watermarking algorithm that operates directly on the MPEG2 bitstream [57]. The
proposed algorithm altered only the quantized ac coefficients of luminance blocks that
belong to intra-frames. Perceptual models combining perceptual analysis and block
classification are used during the embedding to preserve the video quality. In [76],
Wolfgang et al. proposed an image adaptive DCT-based (IA-DCT) approach that
used the visual model described in [72]. This model consists of an image-independent
part based on frequency sensitivity and an image-dependent part based on luminance
sensitivity and contrast masking. They have extended their IA-DCT technique to
video. The best visual quality was obtained by using the IA-DCT watermarking
technique at every I-frame and applying a simple linear interpolation of the water-
marks to the frames between two consecutive I-frames.
A few recently published papers have concentrated on embedding a watermark in
the H.264 bitstream sequence. Qiu et al. proposed a hybrid watermarking scheme
that embedded a robust watermark in the DCT domain and a fragile watermark in
the motion vectors [54]. Their technique embeds the watermark in the compressed
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H.264 video, but it is not robust against common watermarking attacks. Wu et al.
presented a blind watermarking algorithm by embedding the watermark in the H.264
I-frames [77]. Their scheme survives H.264 compression attacks with more than a
40:1 compression ratio in I-frames. However, their scheme requires decompressing
the video to embed the watermark.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a watermarking algorithm
that is robust to self-collusion attacks. Chapter 3 introduces a robust watermark
embedding method for H.264 using Watson’s human visual model. In Chapter 4, we
build a theoretical framework for watermark detection based on a likelihood ratio
test. This framework is used to obtain video watermark detection with controllable
detection performance when the precise location of the watermark is known to the
detector, a detector we call location-aware. In Chapter 5, we introduce a watermark
embedding algorithm that controls the video bit rate increase in compressed-video.
This algorithm makes watermark embedding in P-frames possible. Chapter 6 presents
a variation on the watermark detection algorithm presented in Chapter 4 that does
not depend on where the watermark signal is embedded called the location-unaware






Watermarking digital video introduces challenges that are not present when water-
marking digital images. The large amount of data and inherent redundancy between
frames makes video watermarking algorithms susceptible to self-collusion attacks.
The self-collusion attack is one of the most powerful attacks for video. If the same
watermark is embedded in all the frames, the watermark data can be estimated from
each frame, and the average of those estimates will be a refined estimate. If different
watermarks are embedded in similar frames, the attacker can average those frames to
reduce the strength of the watermark and possibly render it unreadable. Therefore,
the watermarks inserted in two video frames should be as similar as the two frames
are.
The collusion problem was first addressed by Swanson et al. [63], who presented a
scene-based video watermarking technique that is robust to self-collusion attacks. In
their technique, the video sequence is segmented to different scenes and a temporal
wavelet transform is applied to the frames in each scene. The watermark is added to
the low-pass and high-pass frames of the temporal wavelet transform. They compute
the 8 × 8 DCT of those frames and use the perceptual masking properties of the
human visual model to embed an invisible and robust watermark. Their method uses
a two-level hierarchy of transforms and is considered to be highly complex. Recent
work by Trappe et al. [69] has focused on collusion-resistant digital fingerprinting
that can identify colluders; their work makes use of effective anti-collusion codes for
CDMA-type watermarking using the theory of combinatorial designs. In [60], Su et
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al. present a theoretical framework for the linear collusion analysis of watermarked
digital video sequences, and derive a new theorem equating a definition of statistical
invisibility, collusion-resistance, and two practical watermark design rules. In [59],
the authors develop a novel video watermarking framework based on their collusion-
resistant design rules formulated in [60]. They propose employing a spatially-localized
image dependent approach to create a watermark whose pairwise frame correlations
approximate those of the host video. To characterize the spread of its spatially-
localized energy distribution, the notion of a watermark footprint is introduced. They
explain how a particular type of image dependent footprint structure, comprised of
subframes centered around a set of visually significant anchor points, can lead to
two advantageous results: pairwise watermark frame correlations that more closely
match those of the host video for statistical invisibility, and the ability to apply image
watermarks directly to a frame sequence without sacrificing collusion-resistance.
In this chapter, we design a novel low complexity watermarking algorithm that is
robust to self-collusion attacks [38]. The algorithm embeds the watermark into the
quantized ac residuals of the H.264-compressed video. It achieves collusion resistance
by embedding the watermark in the same location in similar frames and different
locations in dissimilar frames. The coefficient within a macroblock that holds the
watermark is determined by a key that is specific to that macroblock. This requires a
long key stream sequence. To avoid this problem, the key is generated using a public
key extracted from some features of the macroblock and the copyright owner’s secret
key. It is proposed that the relative difference of the dc coefficients of the 4×4 blocks
in a macroblock is a robust feature for public key extraction.
2.1 Proposed Method
Our proposed H.264 watermarking algorithm works at the macroblock level of I-
frames. A macroblock contains a 16 × 16 sample region of a video frame. I-frames
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are chosen for watermark embedding because their existence is crucial for the video
signal. Also, P- and B-frames are highly compressed by motion compensation and
there is less capacity for embedding a watermark in them. The luminance component
of macroblocks in an I-frame is intra-coded in 16×16 or 4×4 intra-prediction modes.
Each 4 × 4 block of residual data is transformed by an integer transform after intra-
prediction. If the macroblock is coded in the 16 × 16 intra-prediction mode, the
dc coefficients of all 4 × 4 blocks are transformed by a 4 × 4 Hadamard transform
after the 4 × 4 integer transform to decorrelate these coefficients further. We only
embed the watermark in the quantized ac residuals of the luma component of 4 × 4
intra-predicted macroblocks. We do not embed the watermark in the 16 × 16 intra-
predicted macroblocks for two reasons. First, the 16×16 intra-prediction mode is used
for smooth regions of the frame, and watermark embedding causes visible artifacts
there. Second, the extra Hadamard transform for this macroblock decorrelates the
dc coefficients even more, and many of these coefficients are zero.
Our proposed algorithm embeds the watermark in one quantized ac residual of
a macroblock. The security of the algorithm is based on the randomness of the
selected coefficient for watermark embedding. Embedding the watermark in only one
coefficient in a macroblock does not induce visible artifacts. However, the attacker
cannot identify which coefficient has been selected. Therefore, he/she has to change
at least half of the coefficients to make watermark detection impossible. However,
changing half of the coefficients results in visible artifacts in the video signal and
renders the video useless.
The selection of the coefficient in the ith macroblock for watermark embedding is
under the control of a key. If the same key is used for every frame, the watermarking
algorithm becomes vulnerable to a self-collusion attack. Thus, a very long key stream
sequence is required. Transmitting a long key, however, would make the algorithm
impractical. This problem is solved by generating the key from a combination of
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a public key, Kpi, extracted from some features of the macroblock, and a secret
key, Ks, possessed by the copyright owner. The public key is extracted from each
macroblock and passed as the plaintext to a cryptographic system with the secret
key, Ks. The ciphertext generated by the cryptographic system is the key for that
macroblock. Since the security demands of watermarking systems are less than those
of cryptographic systems, a fast and simple cryptographic scheme can be used for this
purpose. We used a shift cipher with modulus 2, key Ks, and plaintext Kpi. Two
bits of this key determine the selected 8×8 block in the macroblock, b8i, another two
bits determine the selected 4×4 block in the 8×8 block, b4i, and four bits determine
the selected ac quantized residual in that 4× 4 block, cwi, for watermark embedding.
Kp should be extracted from some features of the macroblock that cannot be changed
by the attacker without degrading the perceptual quality of the video. In the next
section, we describe the public key extraction procedure. Figure 4 shows the structure























Figure 4: A watermark embedding algorithm robust to self-collusion attack.
2.1.1 Extracting the Public Key
To make the extracted public key robust, a feature of the macroblock should be used
to which the human eye is sensitive. One such feature is the set of dc coefficients of
the 4 × 4 blocks. If the dc coefficients themselves are used for public key extraction,
the attacker could change the dc coefficient of every block by the same amount, which
would make watermark detection impossible. This would result in a darker or brighter
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frame, but the perceptual quality of each frame would be preserved. However, if the
relative difference of the dc coefficients of 4×4 blocks is used to determine the public
key, the attacker has to increase or decrease the dc coefficient of one block or more
to make the public key extraction impossible for the copyright owner. This results in
visible artifacts.
To determine the public key, Kpi, the quantized dc residuals of 4×4 blocks of the
ith 4 × 4 intra-coded macroblock are extracted and put in a vector of dc coefficients,
DCi, in a key-scrambled fashion. DCi can have up to 24 elements, 16 elements from
the luma component, Y, and four components from each of the chroma components,
Cb and Cr. The structure of the public key generation is shown in Figure 5. The jth
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Figure 5: Structure of public key generation.
To show the robustness of the extracted public key, one of the dc coefficients in a
macroblock is changed to erase one bit of Kpi. The resulting I-frame and one of the
following P-frames are shown in Figure 6. It can be observed that changing only one
dc coefficient in a macroblock lowers the perceptual quality of the video.
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(a) Original I-frame (b) I-frame after attack
(a) Original P-frame (b) P-frame after attack
Figure 6: Robustness of the extracted public key.
2.1.2 Watermark Embedding
If a compressed video bitstream is to be watermarked, it has to be decoded to some
extent. The closer the watermark embedding operation is to the entropy coding
level, the less computationally complex and more suitable for real-time application
the algorithm becomes. However, the closer the embedding is to the DCT transform
operation, the less the degradation induced by watermark embedding becomes. We
embed the watermark in the reordered quantized ac residuals. Because quantization
is a lossy operation, it is desirable to embed the watermark after quantization to
avoid possible erasure of the watermark. Furthermore, entropy coding and decoding
are fast procedures, and watermark embedding and detection can be done in real
time.
As discussed in Subsection 2.1.1, several bits of Kpi are used to select the coef-
ficient, cwi, in the macroblock for watermark embedding. Kpi has more bits than
required. Thus, the extra key bits can be used to make the algorithm more secure
and robust. To embed the watermark Wi in macroblock i, cwi is modified as follows:
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cwi − 1 if cwi mod 2 = 1
cwi if cwi mod 2 = 0
(3)







cwi if cwi mod 2 = 1
cwi − 1 if cwi mod 2 = 0
(4)
The maximum change made to the quantized coefficient selected for watermark
embedding is one level. Thus, the modification of the unquantized DCT coefficient is
as large as the quantization step size for that block. Consequently, the degradation
induced by watermark embedding is proportional to the quantization error.
Entropy coding produces short codewords for frequently occurring values and
longer codewords for less frequently occurring values. Generally, the values closer to
zero occur more frequently. The watermark embedding method moves some values
closer to zero and some values further. Thus, the average bit rate remains more or
less the same. There is a coded block pattern parameter in H.264 that indicates which
blocks within a macroblock contain coded coefficients. This parameter is computed
before watermark embedding. Thus, if the watermarking algorithm selects a block of
all zero coefficients to embed the watermark, this parameter does not let the change
take place and helps to control the bit rate. When the detector finds that the coef-
ficient selected to hold the watermark bit is in an all-zero block, it knows that the
watermark has not been embedded in that macroblock.
2.1.3 Watermark Decoding
Watermark decoding is performed after entropy decoding. The decoder uses the dc
coefficients of the macroblock with its secret key to find the location of the watermark.








0 if cwi mod 2 = 0
1 if cwi mod 2 = 1
(5)
2.2 Simulation Results
Our proposed watermarking algorithm was implemented in the H.264 reference soft-
ware version JM86 [1]. The standard video sequence carphone (QCIF, 176×144) at
the rate of 30 frames per second was used for simulation. Figure 7 shows the fidelity
of our proposed watermarking algorithm. The frames on the left are an I-frame and
one of the following P-frames of this video sequence coded with the H.264 codec. The
frames on the right are the watermarked version of these frames.
(a) Original I-frame (b) Watermarked I-frame
(a) Original P-frame (b) Watermarked P-frame
Figure 7: Fidelity of the self-collusion resistant watermark embedding algorithm.
The number of watermark bits embedded in an I-frame of six standard video
sequences, the percentage of watermark bits recovered after an H.264 reencoding
attack, and the percentage increase in the video bit rate after watermarking are
given in Table 2. The reencoding attack encodes the watermarked video again with
an H.264 encoder, which has the same encoding parameters as the original encoder
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Table 2: Number of watermark bits per frame, watermark recovery rate after reen-
coding attack, and percentage increase in video bit rate of collusion resistant water-
marking algorithm for six standard video sequences.
Video Watermark bits Reencoding Bit rate
sequence per frame recovery rate increase
carphone 54 68.42% 0.82%
claire 28 88.23% 1.53%
mobile 90 84.70% 0.22%
mother 48 76.47% 1.05%
table 35 82.75% 0.21%
tempete 80 86.30% 0.32%
used to watermark the video, and decodes the watermark in the H.264 decoder. On
average, the watermarking process increased the size of the compressed video by only
0.69%.
Two examples of a hypothetical adversary’s attempt to remove the watermark are
shown in Figure 8. One ac residual and half of the ac residuals in each 4 × 4 block
were modified in the frame on the left and right, respectively. While the first attack
only erases a few bits of the watermark, the second one erases half of the watermark
bits. Both attacks result in a significant degradation in video quality. The proposed
algorithm is not robust against signal processing attacks, because any simple signal
processing operation, such as filtering, changes the prediction modes and subsequently
the residuals in the I-macroblocks of H.264. However, the algorithm is robust against
modifications in the H.264 bitstream domain.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel, low complexity watermarking algorithm robust to self-
collusion attack was presented. The coefficient in a macroblock to be embedded
with the watermark is selected by a key. The key is generated from a robust feature
extracted from the macroblock and a secret key possessed by the copyright owner.
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(a) One coefficient (b) Half of the coefficients
Figure 8: Examples of adversary’s attempt to remove the watermark by modifying
a certain number of quantized ac residuals in a 4 × 4 block.
The relative difference of the dc coefficients of 4×4 blocks is used as a robust feature.
Using macroblock features for watermark embedding makes the algorithm more ro-
bust against self-collusion attacks by embedding the watermark in the same location
in similar frames and different locations in dissimilar frames. The algorithm is fast
and appropriate for real-time applications. Simulation results show that watermark
embedding preserves the perceptual quality of the video. On average, the proposed
algorithm increased the video bit rate 0.69%. The algorithm is robust against modifi-
cation in H.264 bitstream domain, however, it is not robust against signal processing
attacks, because they change the prediction modes and subsequently the residuals in




The main challenge in designing digital watermarking schemes is to balance trans-
parency, robustness and payload, which are conflicting parameters. When embedding
a watermark in compressed videos, it is desirable to obtain transparency while embed-
ding the largest number of watermark bits with the maximum watermark strength.
Human visual models are needed to determine a perceptual upper bound on the
watermark signal strength in each portion of the signal.
Different techniques have been developed that incorporate perceptual knowledge
into watermarking schemes to provide robustness and transparency. Wolfgang et al.
used the visual models developed in [72] for still images to find the just noticeable dif-
ference (JND) for each coefficient, based on frequency sensitivity, luminance masking,
and contrast masking [76]. They embedded the watermark only in those coefficients
that exceeded their JNDs. They extended their method to video by using the algo-
rithm on every I-frame and applying linear interpolation of the watermarks to the
frames between consecutive I-frames. Simitopoulos et al. proposed a watermarking
scheme that embeds the watermark directly into the MPEG stream [57]. To make the
watermark imperceptible, perceptual analysis [72] and block classification techniques
were combined.
In this chapter, we develop a perceptual watermarking algorithm for H.264 that is
robust to common signal processing attacks [39, 41]. Since H.264’s high compression
performance leaves little room for an imperceptible signal to be inserted, we employ
a human visual model to increase the payload and add robustness while limiting
visual distortion. Watson et al. derived a model for distortion perception in 8 × 8
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DCT blocks [46, 72]. This perceptual model has been used in [57, 76] to design
watermarking algorithms for still images and MPEG-2 video. However, H.264 uses a
4× 4 transform [33] instead of an 8× 8 transform. The 4× 4 transform is an integer
orthogonal approximation to the DCT. Since the transform is defined by exact integer
operations, inverse-transform mismatches are avoided. In this work, we extend the
human visual model to the 4×4 DCT block. If all the coefficients with visual capacity
for watermark embedding are used, the visual quality of the video will be degraded.
We propose embedding the watermark in a selected subset of the coefficients that have
visual watermarking capacity by using a key-dependent algorithm. This makes the
algorithm more robust to malicious attacks. Furthermore, we design our algorithm
so that the watermark is spread over frequencies and blocks. This reduces the error
pooling effect described by Watson [72]. Error pooling has not been considered in
previous perceptual watermarking algorithms [57, 76].
The algorithm we proposed in Chapter 2 embeds the watermark in the compressed
video, but this algorithm is not robust against common watermarking attacks. This
is because the watermark is embedded in and extracted from the I-frame residuals.
Any simple processing, such as filtering followed by reencoding by an H.264 encoder
changes the intra-macroblock prediction modes, and thus the residuals, which makes
watermark recovery impossible. In this chapter, we present a robust watermarking
algorithm for H.264. To achieve this goal we embed the watermark in the quantized
DCT residuals to avoid decompressing the video and also to reduce the complexity of
the watermarking algorithm. However, the watermark is extracted from the decoded
video sequence to make the algorithm robust to intra-prediction mode changes.
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3.1 A Human Visual Model for the 4 × 4 DCT
The DCT coefficients Xi,j of an M ×M block of image pixels x(n1, n2) expand the



























1/M i = 0
√
2/M i > 0.
(7)
Human visual sensitivity for each DCT basis function varies as a function of its
frequency. Peterson et al. measured quantization error thresholds at various DCT
frequencies in an 8 × 8 DCT block [47]. Here, we extend the quantization error
visibility thresholds for an 8 × 8 DCT block to those appropriate for a 4 × 4 DCT
block.











0 ≤ i4, j4 ≤ 3, (8)











0 ≤ i8, j8 ≤ 7. (9)
Comparing equations (8) and (9) suggests that the basis function i4j4 of a 4 × 4
DCT will have the same frequencies as the basis function i8j8 of an 8 × 8 DCT, if
i8 = 2 × i4 (10)
j8 = 2 × j4
hold. Since for all 0 ≤ i4, j4 ≤ 3, there exists an i8 and j8 in the range 0 ≤ i8, j8 ≤ 7,
the visibility thresholds of a 4×4 DCT basis function can be derived from the known
visibility thresholds of an 8× 8 DCT basis functions. The factors ci and cj cause the
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amplitude of the errors for a 4×4 DCT to be twice the size as those of an 8×8 DCT.
Thus, to obtain invisibility, the visibility threshold of the i4j4 basis function of a 4×4
DCT is obtained by dividing the visibility threshold of the 2i42j4 basis function of an
8 × 8 DCT by 2. We used the quantization matrices given in [47] for an 8 × 8 DCT
block in the Y CbCr color space to derive the quantization matrices for a 4 × 4 DCT
block. The actual visibility threshold ti,j is half the quantization step size qi,j .
To obtain an image-dependent quantization matrix, two other effects from [72],
luminance masking and contrast masking, are exploited. A simple solution to ap-
proximate luminance masking is with a power function as
ti,j,k = ti,j(X0,0,k/X̄0,0)
aT . (11)
X̄0,0 is the dc coefficient corresponding to the mean luminance of the display and
X0,0,k is the dc coefficient of block, k. aT controls the degree to which this masking
occurs. We choose aT = 0.649 as suggested in [72]. Finally, contrast masking gives
the masked threshold, mi,j,k, for a DCT coefficient Xi,j of block k (Xi,j,k) as
mi,j,k = max[ti,j,k, |Xi,j,k|wi,jti,j,k1−wi,j ] (12)
where wi,j is between 0 and 1. We choose wi,j = 0.7 as the authors of [72] recommend.
The image-dependent approach ensures that each error falls below a threshold.
Furthermore, Watson noted that the visibility of an error is not based solely on the
visibility of the largest error, but instead reflects a pooling of errors over frequency
and within a block. We spread the watermark over frequencies and blocks to reduce
error pooling, which has not been done in the previous perceptual watermarking
algorithms [57, 76].
3.2 Proposed Method
We compute the masked error visibility threshold, mi,j,k, for each coefficient Xi,j in
block k. This threshold is divided by the H.264 quantization step size for that block,
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Qk, to determine the capacity of that coefficient, si,j,k, for holding the watermark:
si,j,k = floor(mi,j,k/Qk). (13)
We denote the set of coefficients with visual capacity for watermark embedding (i.e.
capacity greater than zero) as
CV = {c1, ..., cn} = {Xi,j,k|si,j,k 6= 0, ∀ i, j, k}. (14)
Inserting the watermark in all of the coefficients in CV creates visible artifacts. The
algorithms in [57, 76] only embed the watermark in those coefficients in CV that are
greater than their corresponding visibility thresholds, mi,j,k. However, this signifi-
cantly limits the number of watermarked coefficients. If more coefficients need to be
watermarked in the video frame, the parameters in the visual model that define the
impact of masking need to be increased (aT and wi,j)[72]. The danger is that this
may assume a greater benefit from masking than is actually available, resulting in
noticeable visual artifacts. Furthermore, an adversary can more easily determine the
locations of the watermarked coefficients, making the algorithm less robust to attacks.
A coefficient-selection algorithm chooses a subset of the coefficients in CV . A se-
cret key controls the coefficient-selection process. The algorithm generates a palette
that contains the actual locations of the watermarked coefficients. The owner can
keep this palette for watermark detection or can compute the palette again using
the watermarked video. This palette can be considered as an automatically gener-
ated confirmation number or password. Since the coefficient-selection algorithm is
controlled by a key, the attacker does not know the actual location of watermarked
coefficients in CV . To be confident of eliminating the watermark, an attacker needs
to modify most of the coefficients in CV , which creates visible artifacts.
We designed the coefficient-selection algorithm to spread the watermark over fre-
quencies and blocks. For each 4×4 block, each coefficient is ranked by a key. However,
to spread the watermark over frequencies, we give a higher ranking for watermark
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embedding to those frequencies with the fewest coefficients in CV more frequently.
We embed the watermark only in those coefficients whose magnitude is greater than
a threshold, Tcoef . The algorithm spreads the watermark over blocks by limiting
the number of watermarked coefficients, Tblock, that can be embedded in each block.
Therefore, the algorithm embeds the watermark in the Tblock highest ranking coeffi-
cients in CV that are greater than Tcoef . One advantage of this strategy is that we can
easily increase the watermark payload by increasing Tblock or decreasing Tcoef . Our
experiments show that moderate relaxation of these thresholds increases the number
of watermarked coefficients without impairing the visual quality, because the error
pooling effect is limited. Furthermore, Tblock, and Tcoef can be adaptively adjusted to
control the number of watermarked coefficients in a frame.
3.3 Watermark Embedding
We embed the watermark in the quantized DCT residuals of I-frames. Thus, only
entropy decoding is required to embed the watermark, and the watermark embedding
algorithm has low computational complexity. We use a bipolar watermark W ∈
{−1, 1} with mean zero and variance one.
After any simple attack applied to the decoded video followed by reencoding,
the residuals will change because the I-macroblock prediction modes will change.
However, the linearity property of the DCT guarantees that the watermark is still
present in the decoded video sequence, and we can still detect it with high probability.
In the following, we denote the original pixel values by iijk, the prediction by pijk,
the residual by rijk, and their corresponding DCTs by Iijk, Pijk, and Rijk. Assume
s is a DCT coefficient, then, s̃, s′, and ŝ represent the quantized, watermarked, and
attacked coefficient, respectively. The addition of the prediction and residual is equal
to the original pixel. This can be written as
iijk = pijk + rijk. (15)
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By the linearity property of the DCT,
Iijk = Pijk +Rijk. (16)
The watermark is inserted onto the quantized DCT residual as
R̃′ijk = R̃ijk +Wijk, (17)
and
R′ijk = (R̃ijk +Wijk) ×Qk. (18)
Thus,
I ′ijk = Iijk +WijkQk, (19)
and the addition of the watermark to the quantized DCT residuals is the same as
the addition of the watermark times the quantization step size to the original DCT
coefficients. When common signal processing operations or watermarking attacks on
the video change the prediction mode of the block, the residual and prediction will
change to r̂ijk 6= r′ijk, and p̂ijk 6= pijk. However, if the video quality is still acceptable,
then r̂ijk + p̂ijk = îijk ≈ i′ijk, and the watermark can still be extracted from the
decoded video sequence.
3.4 Two Compressed-Domain Video Watermark Embedding
Scenarios
When embedding a watermark in compressed video, there are two different possible
scenarios. In the following two subsections, we show the structure of watermark
embedding using the human visual model for these two scenarios and discuss their
differences.
3.4.1 Watermark Embedding in the Encoder
In one scenario, the watermark is inserted in the encoder. This scenario is shown in
Figure 9. If we ignore the top path in this block diagram, this is the structure of
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an H.264 encoder. Each macroblock of the current frame is predicted in either intra
or inter prediction mode. The difference between the current macroblock and the
prediction signal is the residual. The residuals are transformed, quantized, reordered
and entropy coded and finally written to the bitstream. There is a backward path
in the encoder that reconstructs the current frame. The perceptual model finds the
location of coefficients with watermarking capacity, CV , using the original video
frame. The coefficient selection algorithm selects a subset of coefficients from the
coefficients with watermarking capacity and the watermark is added to the quantized
DCT residuals at those locations.
In this case, the error induced by watermarking will be corrected in future pre-
dictions and will not propagate within I-frames or to P-frames. Consequently, more
coefficients can be watermarked in the compressed video while maintaining high per-
ceptual quality. However, there will be an increase in the bit rate of the macroblocks































Figure 9: Perceptual watermark embedding in the encoder.
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3.4.2 Watermark Embedding in the Bitstream
In the other scenario, the watermark is embedded into the bitstream. This scenario
is shown in Figure 10. In this case, error propagation makes maintaining high vi-
sual quality a bigger problem than the increase in video bit rate. Since H.264 uses
intra-prediction in I-frames, the error propagates both within I-frames and to P-
frames, with the error propagation in I-frames more severe than in P-frames. One
watermarked coefficient in an I-frame is likely to affect only one pixel in each of the P-
frames predicted from that frame. However, one watermarked coefficient can change
a whole 4×4 or 16×16 block predicted from the block that has the watermarked co-
efficient in an I-frame. To have acceptable visual quality, a drift compensation signal
















Figure 10: Perceptual watermark embedding in the bitstream.
3.5 Exploring the Visibility of Propagated Artifacts in P-
frames for Bitstream Watermarking
When the watermark is embedded in the bitstream, the watermark signal in I-frames
may propagate within I-frames and to the following P- and B-frames and produce
undesirable artifacts. Hartung et al. used drift compensation to compensate for
propagated errors in P- and B-frames [17]. However, the computational complexity
of this solution limits its applicability. Nonetheless, it is important to embed the
watermark so that the propagated artifacts in P- and B-frames are as small as possible.
In this section, we propose using drift compensation as suggested in [17] to compensate
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for the error in I-frames but not P-frames. The error propagation in I-frames is more
severe than P-frames as mentioned in the Subsection 3.4.2. Since the frequency of I-
frames is low in the video sequence, the computational complexity cost will be smaller
than using drift compensation for the whole video sequence.
Our intuition suggests that the propagated artifacts in P-frames are often more no-
ticeable in moving areas because watermark errors can move from locations with high
spatial masking thresholds in I-frames to locations with lower spatial masking thresh-
olds in P- and B-frames. Furthermore, moving errors are usually more objectionable
than static errors, and the human eye naturally pays more attention to moving areas.
On the other hand, temporal masking suggests that the moving areas in a frame have
higher masking thresholds. Therefore, in this section we find the moving areas in the
video frame to explore the visibility of propagated artifacts in those areas. We make
the number of watermarked coefficients in those areas adaptive by changing Tblock
and Tcoef , and we observe the visual quality of the video. Although the information
inferred from motion estimation does not represent true motion, it still carries useful
information for finding an estimate of motion characteristics. In the following two
subsections, we show how to find the moving areas using motion intensity in a frame
and a motion history image (MHI) inferred from motion estimation.
3.5.1 Motion Intensity
P-frames in H.264 contain intra-coded, inter-coded and copy macroblocks. The copy
mode indicates a macroblock is a direct copy of the macroblock at the same location in
the previous reference frame. In inter-coded macroblocks, each partition is predicted
from an area of the same size in a reference frame. Inter-coded macroblocks in a
P-frame are predicted from a previously coded frame using motion compensation. In
intra-coded macroblocks each 16 × 16 or 4 × 4 luma region and each 8 × 8 chroma
region is predicted from previously-coded samples in the same slice. Macroblocks
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Table 3: Number of macroblocks coded in each mode for the first P-frame of six
standard video sequences.
Sequence Copy Intra Inter
claire 71 0 28
carphone 30 5 69
mobile 7 0 92
mother 70 0 29
salesman 85 0 14
table 66 0 33
encoded in intra-coded mode often represent uncovered background. The number of
macroblocks of each prediction type represents the amount of motion versus static
background in each video frame. For example, video sequences with a large fraction
of static background can be expected to have a larger number of macroblocks coded
in copy mode. We denote the number of macroblocks coded in copy mode as Ncopy.
Table 3 shows the number of macroblocks coded in each mode for the first P-frame
of six standard video sequences in QCIF (176× 144) format. In this resolution, there
are 99 macroblocks per frame.
In video sequences with large static backgrounds such as claire, mother, table
and salesman, a large number of macroblocks are coded in copy mode. In video
sequences where most of the frame is moving, such as mobile, few macroblocks are
coded in copy mode. The motion of the video sequence carphone lies between these
extremes.
3.5.2 Spatial Motion Distribution
The motion history image (MHI) has been used in [31] to control motion estimation.
Each pixel (i, j) in an MHI corresponds to the spatial (i, j)th block in a sequence.
The pixel intensity describes how long since there has been motion detected at that
location. Let If (i, j) be the pixel intensity at time index f , with I0(i, j) = 0. At each
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If−1(i, j) + 1 |mvfx(i, j)| + |mvfy (i, j)| = 0
0 |mvfx(i, j)| + |mvfy (i, j)| 6= 0
(20)
where (mvfx(i, j), mv
f
y (i, j)) is the motion vector of block (i, j) at frame f . The MHI
can be considered as a histogram of non-moving regions.
We use the MHI to find the motion history in I-frames from the motion estimation
information in the previous GOP P-frames. The intra period is set to four, and we
modify equation (20) such that the blocks with |mvfx(i, j)| + |mvfy (i, j)| < Tmv are
considered static. The algorithm adaptively calculates Tmv based on the motion







3 Ncopy ≥ 70,
3 + 3(7 − floor(Ncopy/10)) Ncopy < 70.
(21)
This equation, found experimentally, provides a tradeoff between finding enough mov-
ing and static blocks. We assume that copy-mode macroblocks have nearly zero mo-
tion vectors and that intra-coded macroblocks have large motion vectors. The first
and second I-frames of two standard videos with their corresponding motion vectors
from the P-frame before the second I-frame and their MHI are shown in Figure 11.
For display purposes, each pixel of the MHI is depicted as one block. The pixel inten-
sity is normalized between 0 and 255. The black areas in the MHI indicate there has
been motion in those areas in the previous P-frame and they correspond to the non-
white areas in the image that is constructed from the magnitude of motion vectors of
4 × 4 blocks, what we call MV. We observe that the motion history image not only




We implemented our proposed watermarking algorithm in the H.264 reference soft-
ware version JM10.2 [1]. We considered the scenario that the watermark was embed-
ded in the encoder. To compare the perceptual quality of our proposed watermarking
algorithm with the algorithm in [76], an I-frame and the following P-frame from
the standard video sequence carphone (QCIF, 176 × 144) are shown in Figure 12.
The frames on the top are watermarked using our algorithm, and the frames on the
bottom are watermarked using the approach in [76]. Note that only the I-frame is wa-
termarked, but adding a watermark to an I-frame will affect its dependent P-frames.
This figure shows that the perceptual qualities of the watermarked frames from the
two algorithms are comparable. However, there are 929 watermarked coefficients in
the I-frame watermarked with our algorithm whereas the I-frame watermarked with
the algorithm in [76] has only 642 watermarked coefficients.
We used six standard QCIF video sequences (176 × 144) at the rate of 30 frames
per second for our simulation. We choose Tblock = 2 and Tcoef = 10. Table 4 shows the
percentage of the watermarked coefficients from the set of coefficients with visual wa-
termarking capacity, CV , and the average number of watermarked coefficients in each
I-frame for each video sequence for our algorithm versus the algorithm in [76]. The
results show that our algorithm increases the number of watermarked coefficients for
all video sequences except the video sequences mobile and table. These video se-
quences are highly textured. Thus, they have a large number of DCT coefficients with
watermarking capacity. However, our algorithm limits the number of watermarked
coefficients in each block to Tblock = 2, which decreases the number of watermarked
coefficients in those video sequences. The performance of our detection algorithm
proposed in Chapter 4 depends on the number of watermarked coefficients in each
interval. Since these video sequences already have many watermarked coefficients in
each frame, this does not influence the performance of our detection algorithm. It
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Table 4: Percentage of watermarked coefficients from the set of coefficients with
visual watermarking capacity and the average number of watermarked coefficients in
each I-frame for six standard video sequence.
Percentage of watermarked Average number of watermarked
coefficients from CV coefficients in an I-frame
Sequence Our alg. Alg. in [76] Our alg. Alg. in [76]
carphone 19.0% 8.8% 891 609
claire 6.6% 5.0% 450 346
mobile 19.0% 22.4% 2291 2699
mother 7.6% 3.7% 630 309
salesman 20.0% 13.3% 953 626
table 8.0% 8.8% 810 897
is more important to increase the number of watermarked coefficients in those video
sequences that have few DCT coefficients with watermarking capacity. On average,
watermark embedding using our algorithm increases the bit rate of the video by about
5.6% versus 4.3% using the algorithm in [76]. Since these algorithms use human vi-
sual models, the PSNR is not an appropriate metric to compare the visual quality.
However, readers might find it useful to know that the PSNR of the watermarked
video decreases 0.58 dB compared to the compressed (but unwatermarked) video for
our algorithm versus 0.48 dB for the algorithm in [76].
To explore the advantage of using motion characteristic to reduce the visibility of
propagated artifacts in P-frames when the watermark is embedded in the bitstream,
we implemented our proposed watermarking algorithm in the H.264 bitstream using
the reference software version JM10.1 [1] with an intra period of four. To distinguish
between watermarking artifacts from intra-prediction in I-frames and motion estima-
tion in P- and B-frames, we prevented the H.264 encoder from using intra-prediction
in I-frames. We found the moving areas of the video frame using the motion in-
tensity and motion history images. To explore the advantage of using the motion
activity model, we ran the following experiment. We set Tcoef = 10 and Tblock = 2
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for static areas, and we changed Tcoef and Tblock in the moving areas. Our simula-
tion results showed that no significant change in visual quality was observed when
Tblock was changed from zero to five and Tcoef was changed from one to 10. Thus,
exploiting motion characteristics did not have any advantage in terms of improving
the perceptual quality of the video in this case.
In Chapter 4, we develop a watermark detection algorithm with controllable per-
formance and we use it to detect the watermark embedded in the compressed video
using the algorithm presented in this chapter. Our simulation results show that we
achieve the desired detection performance in Monte Carlo trials. The simulation re-
sults also show that our proposed watermarking scheme is robust to 3 × 3 Gaussian
filtering, 50% cropping, addition of white noise, N (0, 0.001), and a trivial deliberate
attack.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a watermarking algorithm for H.264 that is robust to
common signal processing attacks. We achieved this goal by employing Watson’s
human visual model adapted for a 4x4 DCT block to obtain a larger payload and
a greater robustness while minimizing visual distortion. We used a key-dependent
algorithm to select a subset of the coefficients with visual watermarking capacity
for watermark embedding to obtain robustness to malicious attacks. Furthermore,
we spread the watermark over frequencies and within blocks to avoid error pooling.
Our simulation results show that we increased the payload and robustness without
a noticeable change in perceptual quality by reducing this effect. We embedded
the watermark in the coded residuals to avoid decompressing the video. However,
we detected the watermark from the decoded video sequence in order to make the
algorithm robust to intra-prediction mode changes. The result of this work appears
in [39, 41].
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(a) First I-frame (b) Second I-frame
(c) Previous P-frame MV (d) carphone’s MHI
(e) First I-frame (f) Second I-frame
(g) Previous P-frame MV (h) table’s MHI
Figure 11: carphone and table video sequences with their corresponding motion
vector (MV) and motion history images (MHI).
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(c) Our alg.’s watermarked I-frame (d) Our alg.’s Watermarked P-frame
(c) Watermarked I-frame from [76] (d) Watermarked P-frame from [76]
Figure 12: Comparison of the visual quality of our perceptual watermark embedding




The performance of any watermarking scheme relies heavily on the design of the wa-
termark detector. Zeng et al. argued that for the particular application of resolving
rightful ownership using invisible watermarks, it is crucial that the original image not
be directly involved in the watermark detection process [80]. The true owner should
be able to detect the watermark without using a second image, since its authenticity
is also questionable. Hernandez et al. presented a watermark detection algorithm
where the embedding domain is the DCT coefficients except the dc term [19]. Their
algorithm assumes a generalized Gaussian distribution for the ac coefficients of the
DCT and an additive embedding rule. In [35], Nikolaidis et al. considered watermark-
ing in the DCT and DWT domains and the same pdf assumption for the coefficients
as in [19]. The authors employ a Rao test that is equivalent to a generalized like-
lihood ratio test. The resulting detector is asymptotically optimal, meaning that it
is optimal under the assumption of a large data record. Huang et al. presented a
new detection structure for transform domain additive watermarks based on Huber’s
robust hypothesis testing theory [20]. The statistical behaviors of the image subband
coefficients are modeled by a contaminated generalized Gaussian, which tries to cap-
ture a small deviation of the actual situation from the idealized generalized Gaussian.
The performance of these algorithms has been tested on different images.
In this chapter, we build a theoretical framework for watermark detection using
a likelihood ratio test, and we use this framework to obtain video watermark de-
tection with controllable performance [41, 42]. We show that performance of our
video watermark detector depends upon three parameters: the average of the squares
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of the H.264 quantization step sizes of watermarked DCT coefficients, the standard
deviation of watermarked DCT coefficients, and the number of watermarked DCT co-
efficients, Nw, over which the detector response is computed. We cannot control the
standard deviation of the DCT coefficients or the quantization step size, but, when
detecting watermarks in video, we can control the number of watermarked coefficients
used to compute the detector response. This is not the case with images, since there
is a limited number of coefficients that can be watermarked in each image before the
watermark is visible. Therefore, our video watermark detection algorithm calculates
Nw to obtain the desired probability of a detection, PD, for a given probability of a
false alarm, PF . Our simulation results show that the theoretically chosen value for
Nw does lead to the desired values of PD and PF in Monte Carlo trials.
4.1 Theoretical Framework
Watermark detection is a classical detection problem [71] where one hypothesis states
that the watermark is present and the other states that the watermark is not present.
Detecting the watermark requires choosing between the two hypotheses. The obser-
vations under the two hypotheses are as follows:
H0 : yℓ = Iℓ ℓ ∈ CW,
H1 : yℓ = Iℓ +WℓQℓ ℓ ∈ CW,
(22)
where CW is the set of watermarked coefficients, Iℓ is the selected DCT coefficient of
the video frame, Qℓ is the H.264 quantization step size selected by the video encoder
for that coefficient and Wℓ is chosen from a bipolar watermark sequence with mean
zero and variance one. The index ℓ denotes the ℓth watermark bit or the ℓth DCT
coefficient. It has been shown that the ac coefficients of the DCT are well modeled























and Γ(.) is the gamma function. A value of c = 0.8 models the ac coefficients reason-
ably well. The value of c = 2 results in a normal Gaussian distribution. For simplicity,
we assume that c = 2 and show that it results in low complexity watermark detection
algorithm with controllable detection performance. The performance and results of
the detector when c 6= 2 are still valid, but, in this case the detector is suboptimal.

















where η controls the tradeoff between missed detections and false alarms [71]. As-
suming that the watermarked DCT coefficients have Gaussian distribution, and they
are statistically independent and substituting the joint probability density into the

















































see that we can detect the watermark by multiplying the DCT coefficients in CW of
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the decoded frame, Yℓ, by the original watermark bits, WℓQℓ, calculating the sum of
those terms, and comparing the result with a threshold.
Assuming that the DCT coefficients are independent and applying the central
limit theorem, Y is N (0, NwQ̄2wσ2w) under H0, and Y is N (NwQ̄2w, NwQ̄2wσ2w) under
H1, where σw is the standard deviation of DCT coefficients in CW . Multiplying (29)
by 1/(σw
√































Then, ψ is N (0, 1) under H0 and is N (
√
NwQ̄2w/σw, 1) under H1. These probability
densities are shown in Figure 13. The distance between the means of the two densities










Figure 13: Probability densities pψ|H0(Ψ|H0) and pψ|H1(Ψ|H1) for a location-aware
detector.
To evaluate the performance of the watermark detector, we compute the proba-


















2 dx = erfc(T ) (33)
To achieve the specified value of PD and PF , the detector selects the threshold
to agree with the value of PF and then selects d to achieve the target values of PD.






Q̄2w is the average of the squares of the H.264 quantization step sizes of the DCT
coefficients in CW and is chosen by the encoder. σw is the standard deviation of the
DCT coefficients in CW and is a property of the video. Therefore, the watermark
detector cannot change either of these two parameters. However, the third parameter,
Nw, is the number of DCT coefficients in CW used to compute the detector response,
and it can be chosen by the detection algorithm to obtain the desired value of d. The
detector finds the value of Nw by solving (34) for it. The detector then computes the
detector response, ψ, over Nw coefficients in CW . The stream of Nw watermarked
DCT coefficients may extend across several I-frames or may be contained within a
fraction of an I-frame. Note that if Qℓ = Q is fixed for all the watermarked DCT






Our watermark detection scheme has several advantages. First, the error rate of the
detector can be maintained regardless of the video sequence given that the video
is long and the detector response latency can be arbitrary. The detector response,
ψ, has the same probability distribution regardless of the video sequence. However,
based upon Nw and the number of watermarked DCT coefficients in each I-frame, the
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number of I-frames needed to compute ψ varies. This means that the detector will
produce results more frequently for some videos than others. We believe that this is
acceptable since nearly every video should have a sufficient number of watermarked
DCT coefficients to produce detector responses at an acceptable rate. Another ad-
vantage is that the responsibility of choosing the value of Nw lies completely with the
detector and does not place any burden on the watermark embedding system. For
example, if the watermark detector notices that the video sequence has been attacked
to remove the watermark, it can increase the value of Nw to obtain more reliable de-
tector response. Notice that we are taking advantage of the large amount of data in
video sequences compared to images to obtain more robust watermark detection. An-
other advantage is that computing the detector response, ψ, has low computational










The watermark sequence is a bipolar sequence of {−1, 1}, and usually Qℓ is constant
within a subset of DCT coefficients that are used to compute one detector response.
Thus, computing the detector response requires only the addition or subtraction of
the DCT coefficients with few multiplications. However, choosing Nw requires com-
puting the standard deviation of coefficients in CW , which has high computational
complexity, but this standard deviation varies over a small range. Thus, if the com-
putational complexity of computing σw for the video frames is undesirable, one can
always assume an upper limit on the value of σw and set Nw accordingly.
4.2 Simulation Results
To test the performance of our watermark detection scheme, we implemented our
watermark embedding scheme proposed in Chapter 3 in the H.264 reference software
version JM10.2 [1]. We considered the scenario that the watermark was embedded in
the encoder, and we used six standard video sequences in the QCIF (176×144) format
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at the rate of 30 frames per second. To compare the experimental results with the
theoretical framework derived in the previous section, a large number of watermarked
coefficients are required to compute the detector response many times. Thus, we
coded and watermarked I-frames of every video sequence 80 times by an H.264 encoder
with an intra period of one (group of pictures: I B I). Note that the more detector
responses we have, the more smoothly we can estimate their distribution. The H.264
encoder used a fixed quantization step size Q = 16 for I-frames.
The goal of our first experiment is to obtain PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01. Solving
(32) and (33) analytically, these probabilities can be achieved for T = 2.325 and
d = 4.65. Comparing the watermarked coefficients from the decoded video with
their values before the watermark was added, we notice that the difference is not
exactly equal to the quantization step size, because the encoding process is lossy. On
average, the difference between the watermarked coefficients and their values before
watermarking is Q̂ instead of Q, where Q̂ is generally smaller than Q, but close to it.






to find Nw. This equation suggests that the smaller the values of the quantization
parameter are, the larger Nw must be to obtain the desired performance. Also the
larger the value of σw, the larger Nw must be to obtain the desired performance.
Table 5 shows the average value of Q̂ and σw calculated over 80 watermarked
sequences for each video and the corresponding Nw to obtain d = 4.65. We detect
the watermark by computing the detector response over Nw watermarked coefficients
for each video. The threshold is set at T = d/2 = 2.325. We calculate the probability
of a detection and probability of a false alarm based on this threshold. PD and PF
and the mean value of the detector response, mψ, obtained from our experiments
are also shown in Table 5. Our results show that PD is close to 0.99, PF is close
to 0.01, and mψ is close to d = 4.65 for all the video sequences. In Figure 14, we
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Table 5: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01
for a location-aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw mψ PD PF
carphone 14.40 59.17 365 4.68 0.9898 0.0108
claire 13.52 81.73 790 4.67 0.9905 0.0114
mobile 15.37 51.86 246 4.71 0.9917 0.0121
mother 12.91 63.65 526 4.64 0.9877 0.0140
salesman 14.33 54.60 314 4.67 0.9913 0.0109
table 14.95 59.45 342 4.70 0.9920 0.0107
plot the probability distribution of the detector response under H0 and H1 for the
video sequence carphone. We have a total of 31978 detector responses from coding
this video sequence 80 times. The symbols ◦ and ⋄ reflect the number of detector
responses in the intervals centered around them. We have scaled the number of
detector responses in each interval so that their largest value has the same value as
the peak of a Gaussian distribution with variance one. This figure shows that the
experimentally determined p(Ψ|H0) and p(Ψ|H1) approximate a normal Gaussian
distribution with a variance of one. This justifies our assumption that the detector
response has a normal Gaussian distribution.
In the next experiment, the target is to obtain PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001.
Solving equations (32) and (33) analytically, these probabilities can be achieved with
T = 3.09 and d = 6.18. Table 6 shows the average values of Q̂ and σw and the corre-
sponding Nw to obtain d = 6.18. PD and PF and the mean of the detector response,
mψ, obtained from our experiments are also shown in Table 6. Again our results
show that PD is close to 0.999 and PF is close to 0.001 for all the video sequences.
In Figure 15, we plotted the probability distribution of the detector response under
H0 and H1 for the video sequence carphone. This figure shows that p(Ψ|H0) and
p(Ψ|H1) are further apart than p(Ψ|H0) and p(Ψ|H1) in Figure 14.





















Figure 14: Detector response probability distribution of a location-aware detector
to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for carphone video sequence.
Table 6: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF =
0.001 for a location-aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw mψ PD PF
carphone 14.40 59.17 645 6.21 0.9992 0.0009
claire 13.52 81.73 1395 6.20 0.9995 0.0014
mobile 15.37 51.86 435 6.25 0.9990 0.0014
mother 12.91 63.65 928 6.16 0.9991 0.0015
salesman 14.33 54.60 554 6.20 0.9992 0.0009
table 14.95 59.45 604 6.23 0.9993 0.0016
(33), we find that T = 3.09 achieves PF = 0.001. Then, from (32), we find that
d = 5.416 achieves PD = 0.99. Finally, we solve (37) to obtain the required Nw for
each video sequence. Table 7 gives PD, PF and the mean of the detector response, mψ,
for each video sequence. Figure 16 shows p(Ψ|H0) and p(Ψ|H1), and the threshold T
for the video sequence carphone for this case. Since the probability of a false alarm
is smaller than the probability of a missed detection, the threshold is to the right of
where p(Ψ|H0) and p(Ψ|H1) intersect.





















Figure 15: Detector response probability distribution of a location-aware detector
to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001 for carphone video sequence.
Table 7: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF =
0.001 for a location-aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw mψ PD PF
carphone 14.40 59.17 495 5.44 0.9904 0.0012
claire 13.52 81.73 1071 5.43 0.9895 0.0009
mobile 15.37 51.86 334 5.48 0.9921 0.0012
mother 12.91 63.65 713 5.40 0.9882 0.0012
salesman 14.33 54.60 426 5.44 0.9916 0.0009
table 14.95 59.45 464 5.46 0.9924 0.0013
consider a 3×3 Gaussian filtering attack. We choose Nw and the threshold, T = 3.09,
as in Table 6 to approximate PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001 without any attack.
Table 8 gives Q̂, σw, mψ, PD and PF after the Gaussian filtering attack. Comparing
Table 8 with Table 6 shows that after the Gaussian filtering attack the variance of
the video sequences remains approximately the same, but Q̂ becomes significantly
smaller. Thus, if we choose Nw as before, p(Ψ|H1) moves towards p(Ψ|H0) because
the mean value of ψ under hypothesis H1, mψ, becomes smaller. Since we set the





















Figure 16: Detector response probability distribution of a location-aware detector
to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.001 for carphone video sequence.
Table 8: Experimental results after the 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack when the
target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001 for a location-aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw mψ PD PF
carphone 10.02 60.12 645 4.25 0.9118 0.0009
claire 9.56 81.01 1395 4.42 0.9300 0.0014
mobile 9.43 51.92 435 3.79 0.8300 0.0014
mother 9.62 65.11 928 4.49 0.9400 0.0015
salesman 10.08 54.57 554 4.36 0.9380 0.0009
table 9.35 59.59 604 3.85 0.8500 0.0016
than 0.999. Comparing Table 8 with Table 5 shows that the mψ’s obtained for each
video sequence are similar. Thus, we can still achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 by
choosing T as we did for Table 5.
Increasing Nw further, we can still achieve PD = 0.999, and PF = 0.001. Suppose
that after the Gaussian filtering attack, Q̂ becomes as small as 9 and suppose that the
variance of the video sequences remains the same. We use these values to calculate the
required Nw for each video sequence. Table 9 shows the assumed Q̂, the calculated
value for Nw, and PD and PF after the 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack. Since we
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Table 9: Experimental results after the 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack with new
values of Nw when the target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001 for a location-
aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw mψ PD PF
carphone 9 59.17 1650 6.79 > 0.9998 0.0017
claire 9 81.73 3149 6.65 > 0.9992 0.0007
mobile 9 51.86 1268 6.47 > 0.9999 0.0011
mother 9 63.65 1910 6.44 > 0.9997 0.0009
salesman 9 54.60 1405 6.94 > 0.9999 0.0011
table 9 59.45 1666 6.40 > 0.9998 0.0007
assumed that Q̂ gets smaller than it actually does and we set the threshold as before,
we always do better in detection than PD = 0.999. We did not find any missed
detections for any of the video sequences in our experiment. Therefore, the only
statement that we can make is that the probability of missed detection, PM , is smaller
than one over the number of detector responses we computed, and PD is greater than
1 minus this value.
We also consider a cropping attack. In our experiment, we crop each video frame
to approximately 50% of its original size from the four sides. We assume that the
detector can determine how the video is cropped by using either the original video
sequence or synchronization templates. The simulation results show that the cropping
attack does not affect the detection performance, however, it does affect the number of
detector responses that can be extracted for each video sequence. Table 10 shows Nw
and the number of QCIF (176 × 144) I-frames, F , required to compute the detector
response for different detection performance scenarios and after Gaussian filtering
and cropping attacks. Assume that video is displayed at the rate of 30 frames per
second and an I-frame is sent once per second. Then, this table suggests that we will
be able to extract one detector response in every F seconds. We see that the largest
value of F = 7.41 happens for the claire video sequence after the Gaussian filtering
attack. Note that the QCIF format (176 × 144) has one of the smallest resolutions;
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Table 10: Number of I-frames required to compute the detector response for differ-
ent detection performance scenarios and after the 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering and 50%
cropping attacks for a location-aware detector.
No attack No attack Filtering Cropping
PD = 0.99 PD = 0.999 PD = 0.999 PD = 0.999
PF = 0.01 PF = 0.001 PF = 0.001 PF = 0.001
Sequence Nw F Nw F Nw F Nw F
carphone 365 0.46 645 0.82 1650 2.09 645 1.37
claire 790 1.85 1395 3.28 3149 7.41 1395 5.69
mobile 246 0.12 435 0.21 1268 0.61 435 0.37
mother 526 0.95 928 1.64 1910 2.67 928 3.47
salesman 314 0.39 554 0.70 1405 1.78 554 1.01
table 342 0.46 604 0.82 1666 2.26 604 1.41
these results improve for higher resolution videos. Furthermore, we only embed the
watermark in the luminance component of I-frames. The number of watermarked
coefficients and subsequently the frequency of the detector response can be increased
by embedding the watermark in P-frames and/or chroma components.
Next, we consider the effect of additive white noise. We add white noise of mean
zero and variance 0.001 to each frame of the video sequence. We chose this variance
experimentally so that the noise is visible, but the video is not useless. We choose Nw
as in Table 6 to obtain PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001. Table 11 shows Q̂, σw, mψ, PD
and PF after the additive white noise attack. The results shows that the proposed
algorithm is robust to an additive white noise, N (0, 0.001), attack without increasing
Nw.
Finally, we examine a trivial deliberate attack to erase the watermark. The adver-
sary does not know which coefficients from the set CV have been watermarked, nor
does he know the value of the watermark inserted in each watermarked coefficient.
Recall that the set CV is the set of coefficients with visual watermarking capacity. To
be confident that he has erased the watermark, he has to modify all the coefficients
in CV. Since he does not know the value of the watermark, a trivial way to erase the
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Table 11: Experimental results after the additive white noise attack when the target
is to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001 for a location-aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw mψ PD PF
carphone 14.39 59.17 645 6.19 0.9989 0.0009
claire 13.26 81.77 1395 6.08 0.9988 0.0014
mobile 15.33 51.86 435 6.18 0.9991 0.0014
mother 12.84 63.65 928 6.14 0.9984 0.0015
salesman 14.32 54.60 554 6.19 0.9994 0.0009
table 14.84 54.45 604 6.14 0.9990 0.0016
watermark is to add the H.264 quantization step size, Q, to all the coefficients in CV
or randomly add +Q or −Q to all the coefficients in CV . In both cases, he can only
erase half of the watermark bits, and at the same time he increases the strength of
remaining watermark bits by a factor of two. Since the detector response is a sum
of the products of the watermark and watermarked coefficients scaled by their H.264
quantization step size, the average value of the detector response remains the same.
The watermark detector can detect the watermark with the same performance with-
out increasing Nw. Figure 17 shows a watermarked I-frame on the left and attacked
version of that I-frame on right. The visual quality of the attacked I-frame is not
severely degraded because the adversary only modified the coefficients with visual
watermarking capacity. However, there are some small artifacts around the right side
of the person’s face, the left side of color of his coat and more artifacts are visible in
the white and blue slats on the left. Note that in the watermarked frame 13.4% of
coefficients in CV were watermarked with a strength of Q, and the attacked frame
corresponds to a frame that has 86.6% of its coefficients in CV watermarked with
a strength of Q and 6.7% of its coefficients watermarked with the strength of 2Q.
Therefore, we expect that the visual quality of the attacked I-frame to be worse than
the watermarked I-frame. This agrees with our earlier observation that inserting the
watermark in all the coefficients in CV results in visible artifacts.
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We have compared our detection scheme with soft decision Viterbi decoding. Our
results show that the detection performance is better when N = 1500 than when we
construct a rate 1/3 convolutional code with N = 500.
(a) Watermarked I-frame (b) Attacked I-frame
Figure 17: Comparison of the visual quality after an adversary’s attempt to remove
the watermark by randomly adding +Q or −Q to all the coefficients in CV .
4.3 Discussion
We showed that the problem of watermark detection for video signals is different
from images because of the large watermarking capacity in videos. By appropriately
choosing the number of coefficients to compute the detector response, we can achieve
any probability of detection and false alarm.
In our experiments, we assume that we know the values of Q̂ and σw. If memory
is not an issue, the owner can save these values in his records for different video
sequences. Furthermore, if computational complexity is not an issue, the detector
can calculate σw. Otherwise, since they vary only over a small range, the detector
can assume a minimum value for Q̂, and a maximum value for σw and choose Nw
accordingly.
We assume that the detector can synchronize after any attack that causes desyn-
chronization. However, if the original video sequence is not available, appropriate
synchronization templates [3] are required to synchronize. Furthermore, we have not
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considered the effect of a self-collusion attack, which is one of the most powerful at-
tacks for video. Our technique presented in Chapter 2 can be used as one solution to
combat the self-collusion attack. The watermark can be embedded in different coef-
ficients in CV by using the public and secret key proposed in Chapter 2. In [39], we
showed that a similar watermark embedding technique to the technique in this paper
is fairly robust to H.264 requantization. However, because of the computational com-
plexity of this attack, it was not investigated in this chapter. Furthermore, we only
showed the robustness of our algorithm to a trivial deliberate attack. Implementing
more complex adversarial attempts to erase the watermark is a subject of further
study.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we built a theoretical framework for watermark detection using a
likelihood ratio test and used it to obtain video watermark detection with control-
lable detection performance. We detected the watermark by multiplying the possibly
watermarked DCT coefficients of the decoded frame by the original watermark bits,
calculating the sum of those terms, normalizing the result, and comparing it with a
threshold. We have proved that the performance of the watermark detector only de-
pends upon the conditional mean of the detector response under the hypothesis that
the watermark exists in the DCT coefficients. This mean depends on three param-
eters: the H.264 quantization step size, the standard deviation of the watermarked
DCT coefficients, and the number of watermarked DCT coefficients used to compute
the detector response, Nw. We cannot control the first two parameters, however, we
can control Nw. This is not the case with images, since there is a limited number of
coefficients that can be watermarked in each image before the watermark is visible.
Therefore, our video watermark detection algorithm calculates the number of DCT
coefficients needed to compute the detector response to obtain the desired probability
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of detection, PD for a given probability of a false alarm PF . Our simulation results
show that the theoretically chosen value for N does lead to the desired PD and PF
in Monte Carlo trials. Furthermore, even after watermarking attacks, we can obtain
any PD and PF by making worst case assumption on the first two parameters and
computing Nw accordingly. The result of this work appears in [41, 42].
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CHAPTER V
WATERMARK EMBEDDING WITH CONTROLLED
VIDEO BIT RATE INCREASE
Most video watermarking algorithms embed the watermark in I-frames, which are
essential for the video signal, but refrain from embedding in P- and B-frames, which
are highly compressed by motion compensation. However, P-frames appear more
frequently in the compressed video and their watermarking capacity should be ex-
ploited, despite the fact that embedding a watermark signal in P-frames can increase
the video bit rate significantly.
In this chapter, we show that by limiting the watermark to nonzero quantized ac
residuals in P-frames, the video bit rate increase can be held to reasonable values
[37, 40]. Since the nonzero quantized ac residuals in P-frames correspond to non-flat
areas that are in motion, temporal and texture masking are exploited at the same
time. We also show that by embedding the watermark only in nonzero quantized ac
residuals that have spatial masking capacity in I-frames, the number of watermarked
coefficients in I-frames doubles with an increase in video bit rate that is no greater
than previous compressed-domain video watermarking algorithms.
5.1 Problems Associated with Embedding the Watermark
in P-frames
The algorithms proposed in [41, 57, 76] embed the watermark in I-frames because
I-frames are crucial for the video signal. Note that our algorithm in [41] is the same
as the algorithm presented in Chapter 3. Furthermore, P- and B-frames have less
capacity because they are highly compressed by motion compensation. However,
P-frames occur more frequently than I-frames in the compressed video. We used
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Table 12: Percentage increase in video bit rate and the average number of wa-
termarked coefficients per frame when I- or P-frames are watermarked using the
algorithms in [41] and [76] for the scenario that the watermark is embedded in the
encoder.
Percentage increase Average number of
in video bit rate watermarked coefficients
I P I P
Sequence [76] [41] [76] [41] [76] [41] [76] [41]
carphone 3.85% 5.60% 12.40% 18.27% 588 851 527 750
claire 7.90% 10.56% 17.35% 20.94% 270 342 252 303
mobile 5.47% 5.01% 19.32% 16.93% 2664 2252 2315 1944
mother 4.99% 9.22% 8.92% 20.58% 261 499 229 447
salesman 3.42% 5.04% 10.88% 17.69% 597 893 413 621
soccer 1.83% 2.54% 4.50% 7.73% 430 609 399 589
table 3.44% 3.60% 12.30% 11.88% 894 788 557 529
tempete 3.66% 4.20% 14.01% 18.23% 1328 1682 1215 1528
Average 4.32% 5.72% 12.46% 16.53% 879 990 738 839
the algorithms proposed in [41, 76] to embed the watermark in I- or P-frames. Our
simulation results show that we can embed the watermark in a large number of
coefficients in P-frames while preserving high visual quality, but the video bit rate
can increase significantly. We set Tblock = 2 and Tcoef = 10 for the algorithm in
[41] using a group of picture (GOP) structure of I B P B P B I, which has twice as
many P-frames as I-frames. Since the video sequences are short, we used this GOP
structure to obtain a sufficient number of watermarked I-frames, but a typical H.264
GOP would have more P-frames. Tables 12 and 13 show the increase in video bit
rate and the average number of watermarked coefficients in an I- or P-frame when
the watermark is embedded in the encoder and bitstream, respectively.
Tables 12 and 13 show that the increase in video bit rate is very significant when
P-frames are watermarked for both watermark embedding scenarios. This increase
in video bit rate has two sources. First, there is an increase in the bit rate of the
macroblocks that were watermarked. Changing zero-valued coefficients to nonzero
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Table 13: Percentage increase in video bit rate and the average number of wa-
termarked coefficients per frame when I or P-frames are watermarked using the al-
gorithms in [41] and [76] for the scenario that the watermark is embedded in the
bitstream.
Percentage increase Average number of
in video bit rate watermarked coefficients
I P I P
Sequence [76] [41] [76] [41] [76] [41] [76] [41]
carphone 1.80% 3.19% 9.95% 15.10% 589 858 515 731
claire 4.50% 5.92% 14.97% 18.04% 265 339 251 297
mobile 1.96% 2.33% 16.96% 15.18% 2668 2259 2299 1934
mother 2.95% 6.59% 7.78% 18.30% 268 533 232 446
salesman 1.79% 2.94% 9.73% 15.83% 607 915 417 630
soccer 0.97% 1.48% 3.40% 5.85% 435 634 396 590
table 1.26% 1.83% 9.98% 9.96% 895 790 552 533
tempete 1.59% 2.09% 11.52% 15.32% 1331 1688 1209 1523
Average 2.10% 3.29% 10.53% 14.19% 882 1002 734 835
values can significantly increase the video bit rate because H.264 uses a run-length
code. Since the number of nonzero coefficients in P-frames is very small compared
to I-frames, there is a high probability that a zero coefficient changes to a nonzero
coefficient. Thus, the increase in video bit rate is more significant when P-frames are
watermarked. Second, if the watermark is embedded in the encoder, there will be an
increase in the bit rate of the macroblocks that are predicted from the watermarked
macroblocks. This is confirmed by comparing the results of Table 12 and 13, which
shows that the increase in video bit rate when the watermark is embedded in the
bitstream is smaller than when it is embedded in the encoder.
The reason for the slight difference in the number of watermarked coefficients in I-
frames when the watermark is embedded in the encoder for the algorithms in [41, 76]
with the values reported in Chapter 3 is as follows. H.264 has an option of using
both 4 × 4 and 8 × 8 transforms. The watermark detection algorithm in Chapter
4 [41] computes the location of watermarked coefficients based on Watson’s human
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visual model assuming that all blocks use a 4×4 transform, since the majority of the
blocks usually use 4 × 4 transforms. However, the information about the transform
used for each block is no longer available after the video is decoded. Therefore,
the watermark detector assumes that the coefficients in 8 × 8 transformed blocks
are watermarked and uses them with other watermarked coefficients to detect the
watermark. This causes the value of Q̂ used in the watermark detector to be further
from the quantization step size (Please see Chapter 4 for explanation of Q̂.) In this
chapter, to have a fair comparison of the actual number of watermarked coefficients
in these algorithms, and because our new watermark detection algorithm does not
depend on the location of watermarked coefficients, we do not count the number
of coefficients in 8 × 8 transformed blocks that the watermark detector thinks are
embedded with a watermark.
5.2 Proposed Method
The significant increase in video bit rate when the watermark is embedded in P-frames
is probably unacceptable for video watermarking applications; thus, it is important
to develop a watermarking scheme for P-frames than can hold the increase in video
bit rate to reasonable values. To control the increase in video bit rate, it is important
to not change the zero-valued coefficients in P-frames. Therefore, our proposed wa-
termarking algorithm only embeds the watermark in nonzero quantized ac residuals
in P-frames. Since the number of nonzero quantized ac residuals that have spatial
masking capacity in P-frames is small, we embed the watermark in all the nonzero
quantized ac residuals without using Watson’s human visual model. We do not em-
bed the watermark in dc coefficients because the human eye is highly sensitive to
the dc value. Furthermore, embedding the watermark in dc coefficients increases
the computed video sequence variance significantly. To maintain the performance of
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our watermark detector presented in Chapter 6, which is a variation of the water-
mark detector in Chapter 4, the number of watermarked coefficients would have to
be increased so much as to negate any benefit from using the dc coefficients.
In Chapter 3, when embedding the watermark in I-frames, we saw that the algo-
rithms in [41, 57, 76] embed the watermark in a subset of coefficients in CV (coeffi-
cients with visual capacity for watermark embedding) because embedding in all of the
coefficients in CV creates visible artifacts. In this chapter, when embedding the wa-
termark in I-frames, we propose embedding the watermark in the coefficients in CV
only if their corresponding quantized DCT residuals are non-zero. In the simulation
results section, we show that this will double the number of watermarked coefficients
in I-frames without an additional increase in video bit rate while preserving the per-
ceptual quality of the video.
The watermark is a two-dimensional bipolar matrix, W ∈ {−1, 1}, the same size as
the video frame with mean zero and variance one. However, the watermark embedder
inserts the watermark in a subset of the DCT coefficients, CW , as described before.
The watermark is inserted into those coefficients as
R̃′ijk = R̃ijk +Wijk, (38)
where R̃ijk is the quantized residual and R̃
′
ijk is the watermarked quantized residual.
Thus,
R′ijk = (R̃ijk +Wijk) ×Qijk, (39)
and
I ′ijk = Iijk +WijkQk, (40)
where R′ijk is the watermarked unquantized residual, Qijk is the quantization step
size for coefficient ij in block k, Iijk is the original DCT coefficient, and I
′
ijk is the
watermarked DCT coefficient. The addition of the watermark to the quantized DCT
residuals is the same as the addition of the watermark times the quantization step
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size to the original DCT coefficients. When common signal processing operations
or watermarking attacks on the video change the prediction mode of the block, the
residual and prediction will change. However, if the video quality is still acceptable,
the watermark can still be extracted from the decoded video sequence.
Embedding the watermark in all the nonzero quantized ac residuals without using
Watson’s human visual model in P-frames does not sacrifice visual quality because
these coefficients correspond to non-flat moving areas. To show that the number of
nonzero quantized ac residuals in each frame correspond to the amount of motion,
we compute the global motion intensity in each P-frame. This is found by computing











|reff (w4, h4) − f |
, (41)
where |mvf (w4, h4)| is the magnitude of the motion vector of block (w4, h4) at frame
f , and reff(w4, h4) is the reference frame number for this block. W4 and H4 are the
width and height of the frame measured in 4 × 4 blocks. Figure 18 shows the global
motion intensity of eight standard video sequences.
The plots show that the video sequences claire, mother and salesman are
mostly static with limited motion in some frames. This is expected since these are
videos of a person on a static background who occasionally moves his head or hand
while talking. The video sequence carphone shows a person in a moving vehicle.
Therefore, the background moves frequently and the subject moves his whole upper
body twice towards the end of the video. Thus, it is not surprising that the mo-
tion intensity plot of this video sequence shows higher motion. The video sequences
mobile and tempete have slow continuous motion, and the motion intensity plots
demonstrate that. The video sequence soccer has considerable motion; thus the
motion intensity of all of its frames is at least 250 and reaches as high as 2500. The
video sequence table shows the variation in motion intensity very well. This video
sequence starts with movement of a table tennis player’s hand followed by a scene
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Figure 18: Weighted average magnitude of motion vectors, MVG, in every P-frame
of eight standard video sequences. Notice that the vertical scales vary significantly
from image to image.
change. Figure 19 shows the number of nonzero quantized ac residuals, ν, which
correspond to the number of watermarked coefficients in every P-frame of the eight
standard video sequences. Comparing Figures 18 and 19 shows that the plots of
the number of nonzero quantized ac residuals resemble the global motion intensity
patterns.
5.3 Simulation Results
We implemented our proposed watermarking algorithm in the H.264 reference soft-
ware version JM10.2 [1]. We used eight standard video sequences in QCIF format
(176×144) at the rate of 30 frames per second for our simulation results. We compare
the video bit rate increase and the perceptual quality using the visual quality metric
(VQM) of the algorithm proposed in this Chapter with the algorithms in [41, 76].
We computed the video bit rate increase in our algorithm when only I-frames
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Figure 19: Number of nonzero quantized ac residuals, ν, in every P-frame of eight
standard video sequences. Notice that the vertical scales vary significantly from image
to image.
were watermarked and when only P-frames were watermarked. Table 14 shows the
video bit rate increase and the average number of watermarked coefficients for our
proposed algorithm when the watermark is embedded in the encoder and bitstream.
Comparing this table with Table 12 shows that by embedding the watermark in only
nonzero quantized ac residuals in P-frames instead of using the human visual model,
the increase in video bit rate reduces from 12.46% in [76] and 16.53% in [41] to 1.54%,
when the watermark is embedded in the encoder. This reduces the average number
of watermarked coefficients in a P-frame from 738 in [76] and 839 in [41] to 559.
Comparing this table with Table 13 shows that by embedding the watermark in only
nonzero quantized ac residuals in P-frames, the increase in video bit rate reduces from
10.53% in [76] and 14.19% in [41] to 0.66%, when the watermark is embedded in the
bitstream. This reduces the average number of watermarked coefficients in a P-frame
from 734 in [76] and 835 in [41] to 542. Moreover, by embedding the watermark only
in nonzero quantized ac residuals with spatial masking capacity in I-frames, we can
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Table 14: Percentage increase in video bit rate and the average number of water-
marked coefficients per frame when the watermark is embedded in the encoder and
bitstream.
Percentage increase Average number of
in video bit rate watermarked coefficients
Encoder Bitstream Encoder Bitstream
Sequence I P I P I P I P
carphone 4.54% 1.56% 1.17% 0.27% 1235 461 1199 449
claire 7.40% 1.89% 1.81% 1.46% 474 73 460 69
mobile 6.28% 1.22% 2.54% 0.75% 6191 1426 6197 1388
mother 5.93% 2.92% 2.04% 2.30% 501 92 476 87
salesman 3.58% 1.55% 1.00% 1.15% 1106 140 1083 134
soccer 2.14% 0.83% 0.41% −1.04% 813 841 799 822
table 4.02% 0.98% 1.05% 0.23% 2038 390 2037 379
tempete 4.27% 1.37% 1.64% 0.20% 2629 1052 2609 1010
Average 4.77% 1.54% 1.45% 0.66% 1709 559 1857 542
watermark twice as many coefficients in I-frames as [41, 76] with a similar increase in
video bit rate for both watermark embedding scenarios.
Table 14 gives the percentage increase in video bit rate and the average number
of watermarked coefficients in an I- or P-frame. However, since there are two param-
eters, it is hard to compare how different algorithms perform when embedding the
watermark in I- or P-frames. We define the watermark cost, δ, as the increase in the








where TBwatermarked is the number of bits used to code the watermarked video se-




Nw(f) is the total number of watermarked coefficients in that video sequence.
In Tables 15 and 16, we have calculated watermark cost, δ, when the watermark is
embedded in the encoder and bitstream, respectively.
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Table 15: Watermark cost, δ, when the watermark is embedded in the encoder.
I-frame P-frame
Sequence [76] [41] New [76] [41] New
carphone 2.75 2.76 1.54 4.94 5.12 0.71
claire 4.53 4.77 2.41 5.26 5.27 1.98
mobile 2.15 2.33 1.06 4.32 4.67 0.44
mother 4.01 3.87 2.48 4.04 4.78 3.40
salesman 1.95 1.92 1.10 4.49 4.86 1.88
soccer 2.54 2.50 1.58 3.33 3.86 0.29
table 1.60 1.90 0.82 4.54 4.60 0.52
tempete 2.29 2.08 1.35 4.79 4.95 0.54
Average 2.72 2.76 1.54 4.46 4.76 1.22
Table 16: Watermark cost, δ, when the watermark is embedded in the bitstream.
I-frame P-frame
Sequence [76] [41] New [76] [41] New
carphone 1.28 1.56 0.41 4.06 4.34 0.13
claire 2.62 2.70 0.60 4.55 4.63 1.62
mobile 0.77 1.08 0.43 3.82 4.07 0.28
mother 2.31 2.59 0.89 3.48 4.26 2.70
salesman 1.00 1.10 0.31 3.98 4.28 1.48
soccer 1.34 1.40 0.31 2.51 2.90 −0.37
table 0.58 0.96 0.21 3.71 3.84 0.12
tempete 0.99 1.03 0.52 3.95 4.17 0.08
Average 1.36 1.55 0.46 3.75 4.06 0.75
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These tables show several facts.
• The watermark cost, δ, of the algorithm in this chapter is significantly smaller
than the algorithms in [41, 76] when embedding the watermark in both I- and
P-frames for both scenarios.
• The watermark cost, δ, of the algorithms in [41, 76] is significantly smaller when
embedding the watermark in I-frames than P-frames. Thus, the watermarking
capacity of I-frames should be exploited completely before embedding the wa-
termark in P-frames for these algorithms. However, we cannot conclude that
embedding the watermark in either I- or P-frames has an advantage in terms
of increase in video bit rate over the other for the algorithm proposed in this
chapter.
• The watermark cost, δ, is significantly smaller when embedding the watermark
in the bitstream than the encoder for all algorithms.
Table 15 shows the watermark cost, δ, of our proposed algorithm in this chapter
versus the algorithms in [41, 76] when the watermark is embedded in both I- and
P-frames. Our simulation results show that the watermark cost, δ, of our algorithm
in this chapter is 1.50 versus 3.96 for [76] and 4.16 for [41] when the watermark is
embedded in the encoder. The δ of our algorithm reduces to 0.51 when the watermark
is embedded in the bitstream compared to 2.83 and 3.08 for the algorithms in [41, 76],
respectively. The average increase in video bit rate of the proposed algorithm is 8.26%
and 2.42% when the watermark is embedded in encoder and bitstream, respectively.
To compare the perceptual quality of our proposed watermark embedding algo-
rithm in this chapter with the algorithms in [41, 76], we calculated the video quality
metric (VQM) for these algorithms. The VQM software compares an original video
clip and a processed video clip and reports a video quality metric (VQM) that cor-
relates to perception. This metric is between zero and one with zero being no im-
pairment and one being nominally maximum impairment. We used the compressed
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Table 17: Watermark cost, δ, when the watermark is embedded in both I- and
P-frames.
Encoder Bitstream
Sequence [76] [41] New [76] [41] New
carphone 4.21 4.39 1.34 3.03 3.23 0.35
claire 4.97 5.39 2.40 3.89 3.91 0.96
mobile 3.87 3.97 1.11 2.69 2.92 0.38
mother 4.33 4.68 2.66 3.15 3.64 1.46
salesman 3.54 3.66 1.56 2.76 2.97 0.65
soccer 3.12 3.46 0.66 1.94 2.32 −0.16
table 3.60 3.59 1.09 2.37 2.68 0.18
tempete 4.09 4.17 1.18 2.83 2.97 0.33
Average 3.96 4.16 1.50 2.83 3.08 0.51
but not watermarked video sequences as the original video clips and the watermarked
video sequences as the processed video clips. Table 18 shows the VQM metric for
these algorithms when only I-frames and when only P-frames are watermarked. This
table shows that the algorithm in this chapter can embed twice as many watermark
coefficients in each I-frame as the algorithms in [41, 76] with similar perceptual qual-
ity. Moreover, the algorithm in this chapter has the same perceptual quality as the
algorithms in [41, 76] for P-frame only watermarking, although it does not use the
spatial human visual model for embedding in P-frames. The VQM metric when the
watermark is embedded both in I- and P-frames is similar to when only I-frames are
watermarked.
To compare the perceptual quality of our proposed watermark embedding algo-
rithm in this paper with the algorithms in [41, 76], we calculated the video quality
metric (VQM) [4] for these algorithms. The VQM software compares an original
video clip and a processed video clip and reports a video quality metric (VQM) that
correlates to perception. This metric is between zero and one with zero being no im-
pairment and one being nominally maximum impairment. We used the compressed
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Table 18: Visual quality metrics (VQM) for the proposed algorithm and the algo-
rithms in [41, 76] compared to compressed, but not watermarked videos.
I-frames P-frames I and P-frames
Sequence [76] [41] New [76] [41] New [76] [41] New
carphone 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.13
claire 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.10
mobile 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06
mother 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.15
salesman 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.15
soccer 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.09
table 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.16
tempete 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08
Average 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.11
but not watermarked video sequences as the original video clips and the watermarked
video sequences as the processed video clips. Table 18 shows the VQM for these algo-
rithms when only I-frames, only P-frames and both I and P-frames are watermarked.
This table shows that the algorithm in this paper can embed twice as many water-
mark coefficients in each I-frame as the algorithms in [41, 76] with similar perceptual
quality. Moreover, the algorithm in this paper has the same perceptual quality as
the algorithms in [41, 76] for P-frame only watermarking, although it does not use
the spatial human visual model for embedding in P-frames. The VQM when the
watermark is embedded both in I- and P-frames is similar to when only I-frames are
watermarked.
Furthermore, we computed the VQM between the original video and the com-
pressed video, which we denote as CM, and the VQM between the original videos
and the watermarked-compressed videos when only I-frames, only P-frames and both
I- and P-frames are watermarked. Table 19 shows the VQM metric for these cases.
This table shows that the average VQM between the original and compressed videos
for these eight video sequences is 0.14. This table also shows that the average VQM
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Table 19: Visual quality metrics (VQM) for the compressed video, proposed algo-
rithm and the algorithms in [41, 76] compared to original videos.
I-frames P-frames I and P-frames
Sequence CM [76] [41] New [76] [41] New [76] [41] New
carphone 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
claire 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13
mobile 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
mother 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
salesman 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15
soccer 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
table 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20
tempete 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Average 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13
between the original and watermarked-compressed videos when only I-frames, only
P-frames and both I- and P-frames are watermarked is also 0.14, This shows that
the visual quality of the watermarked-compressed videos is the same as the com-
pressed videos when compared to the original video sequences, i.e. watermarking
plus compression did not increase the perceived distortion over compression alone.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explored watermark embedding in P-frames. The challenge in
embedding the watermark in P-frames is that the video bit rate increases signifi-
cantly. Thus, we only embedded the watermark in nonzero quantized ac residuals
in P-frames. Since these coefficients correspond to non-flat areas that are in motion,
temporal and texture masking were exploited at the same time. We showed that the
number of nonzero quantized ac residuals in each frame resembles the motion inten-
sity plots in different video sequences. We also proposed embedding the watermark
in nonzero quantized ac residuals with spatial masking capacity in I-frames. Our sim-
ulation results showed that the bit rate increase per watermark bit of our algorithm
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in this chapter is significantly smaller than the previous compressed-domain video
watermarking algorithms when embedding the watermark in both I- and P- frames.




In some applications, the watermark detector does not know which coefficients are
embedded with the watermark. For example, our watermark embedding algorithm in
Chapter 5 embeds the watermark in the nonzero quantized ac residuals. The identity
of those locations is lost when the video is completely decoded. Furthermore, a
reencoding or a deliberate attack that inserts additional nonzero coefficients would
cause desynchronization and consequent failure in watermark detection. For these
applications it is important that the watermark detection algorithm not depend on
the precise location of the watermark signal.
Thus, the video watermark detection algorithm in this chapter looks at all the ac
coefficients to detect the watermark [37, 42]. Our algorithm calculates the number
of frames, F , required for the watermark detector to obtain the desired probability
of a detection, PD, for a given false alarm probability, PF . This is not the case for
images, since there is a limited number of coefficients that can be watermarked in
each image before the watermark becomes visible. Our simulation results show that
the theoretically chosen value for F does lead to the desired values of PD and PF in
Monte Carlo trials.
6.1 Theoretical Framework
Our new watermark detection algorithm, which is a modification of the watermark
detection algorithm in Chapter 4, looks at all the ac coefficients to detect the water-
mark. Assume that the total number of coefficients used to detect the watermark is
N . From these N coefficients, the watermark signal will be embedded in Nw of them
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and No will not be watermarked. Thus,
N = Nw +No. (43)
The observations under the two hypotheses are as follows:
H0 : yℓ = Iℓ ∀ ℓ (44)






Iℓ ℓ /∈ CW
Iℓ +WℓQℓ ℓ ∈ CW.
where CW is the set of watermarked coefficients, Iℓ is the DCT coefficient of the video
frame, Qℓ is the H.264 quantization step size selected by the video encoder for that
coefficient and Wℓ is chosen from a bipolar watermark sequence with mean zero and
variance one. The index ℓ denotes the ℓth watermark bit or the ℓth DCT coefficient.
The ac coefficients outside of CW are irrelevant to the detection problem and
could have been discarded if the location of watermark signal were known. This can
also be verified by writing the likelihood ratio test for all the ac coefficients. However,
since the watermark detector does not know the exact locations of the watermarked
coefficients, it can compute the detector response over all ac coefficients instead of
only the possibly watermarked coefficients. This does not create a problem because
the mean of the detector response over the coefficients outside CW is close to zero.
In Chapter 4, we saw that the performance of the detector depends on the distance










Expanding the summation, the detector response under the two hypotheses is















Therefore, Y is N (0, NQ̄2σ2) under H0, and Y is N (NwQ̄2w, NQ̄2σ2) under H1, where









Q2ℓ . Note that although the mean of Y under the two hypotheses is




2. Multiplying (45) by 1/(σ
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where T = λ/(σ
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H1. These probability densities are shown in Figure 20. The distance between the



























If the ratio of watermarked coefficients to the total number of coefficients is equal to
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If we use the same embedding algorithm for the location-unaware detector as for
the location-aware detector, the ratio of watermarked coefficients to the total number
of coefficients, ρ = Nw
N
would be the same for both detectors. Then, comparing (50)
with (35), we can conclude that to get the same detection performance (same d) for






where Nw and Ǹw are the number of watermarked coefficients required to compute
the detector response for the location-unaware detector and location-aware detector,
respectively.
The above analysis assumed that the ratio of watermarked coefficients to the total
number of coefficients, ρ, is a constant. However, if the watermark is embedded in
nonzero quantized ac residuals, the number of watermarked coefficients may vary
from frame to frame and consequently ρ will no longer be a constant. Consider N in
(50) to be expressible as N = F ×Nf , where F is the number of frames required to
compute the detector response and Nf is the number of ac coefficients in each frame
for a certain video resolution. Assuming that Nw(f) ac coefficients in frame f are
watermarked, we can define the total number of watermarked coefficients in the ith










i = 1, 2, 3... (53)
where ρF (i) is the ratio of the number of watermarked coefficients to the total number








Thus, the probability distribution of the detector response under the hypothesis that
the watermark exists, H1, is no longer a normal Gaussian distribution, but is a Gaus-
sian mixture model. We form the histogram of NFw divided into K clusters where the
jth cluster, clj, has a centroid of Nj, and
p(NFw (i) ∈ clj) = αj j = 1, 2, ..., K, (55)




αj = 1. We have


















2 j = 1, 2, ...K. (57)
However, the probability distribution of ψ under the hypothesis that the watermark
does not exist is still a normal Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). These probability
distributions are shown in Figure 21. To evaluate the performance of the watermark
detector, we need to compute the probability of detection, PD, and the probability of








2 dx = erfc(T ). (58)
To compute PD , we first define the probability of detection for each Gaussian distri-















αjerfc(T − µj). (60)
To achieve the specified value of PD and PF , the detector selects the threshold





Figure 21: Illustrating the Gaussian mixture model and the probability densities
pψ|H0(Ψ|H0) and pψ|H1(Ψ|H1) for the location-unaware detector.
assuming the probability distribution of the detector response under hypothesis H1
is still a Gaussian distribution. We use the mean number of watermarked coefficients
in each frame, E{Nw} to roughly estimate the number of frames, F , required to get









The computed value of F gives us a starting point. We calculate PD from (60) and
if PD is smaller or greater than the desired PD, we increase or decrease F by one
until we reach the desired value of PD. Our simulation results show that we reach the
optimum value of F in a few iterations in most cases. Since knowing the optimum
value of F does not compromise security or robustness of our watermarking algorithm,
F can be made publicly available.
Our watermark detection scheme has several advantages. First, the error rate of
the detector can be maintained regardless of the video sequence given that the video
is long and the detector response latency can be arbitrary. However, the number
of frames, F , required to obtain a certain detection performance depends on the
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histogram of the number of watermarked coefficients per frame in the video sequence.
This means that the detector will produce results more frequently for some scenes or
some videos than others. We believe that this is acceptable since nearly every video
should have a sufficient number of watermarked DCT coefficients to produce detector
responses at an acceptable rate. Another advantage is that if the watermark detector
notices that the video sequence has been attacked to remove the watermark, it can
increase the value of F to obtain more reliable detector responses. Notice that we are
taking advantage of the large amount of data in video sequences compared to images
to obtain more robust watermark detection. Another advantage is that computing











The watermark sequence is a bipolar sequence of {−1, 1}, and usually Qℓ is constant
within a subset of DCT coefficients that are used to compute one detector response.
Thus, computing the detector response requires only the addition or subtraction of the
DCT coefficients with few multiplications. Notice that the location-aware detector in
Chapter 4 computed the sum in (62) over a smaller set of coefficients that are used to
embed the watermark, Nw. However, finding the location of watermarked coefficients
can have a high computational complexity, particularly if a human visual model is
used. Thus, for some applications, where these locations have to be found every time
a watermark is detected, the watermark detection algorithm in this section has a
significantly lower complexity.
6.2 Simulation Results
To test the performance of our location-unaware detector (LUD), we used this detector
to detect the watermark from P-frames of eight standard video sequences that were
watermarked with the watermark embedding algorithm in Chapter 5. Subsection 6.2.1
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gives the performance of the location-unaware detector and shows the robustness of
the watermark embedding algorithm in Chapter 5 to several common signal processing
attacks when LUD is used to detect the watermark. To compare the performance
of location-aware and location-unaware detectors, we embedded the watermark in
I-frames of six standard video sequences using our perceptual watermark embedding
algorithm presented in Chapter 3. In Subsection 6.2.2, we compare the performance of
our location-unaware detector with the location-aware detector presented in Chapter
4.
6.2.1 Watermark Detection from P-Frames
To evaluate the performance of location-unaware detector and to test the robustness
of our watermark embedding algorithm in Chapter 5, we watermarked every P-frame
of eight standard video sequences in the QCIF (176 × 144) format at the rate of 30
frames per second using the watermark embedding algorithm in Chapter 5. We imple-
mented our watermark embedding algorithm in the H.264 reference software version
JM10.2 [1]. The H.264 encoder used a fixed quantization step size Q = 16 and an
intra period of 3 (group of pictures: I B P B P B I). We detected the watermark from
P-frames of these video sequences using the location-unaware detector. To compare
the experimental results with the theoretical framework for watermark detection de-
rived in the previous section, a large number of watermarked coefficients are required
to compute the detector response many times. Thus, we coded and watermarked
every video sequence 100 times with an H.264 encoder. Note that the more detector
responses we have, the more smoothly we can estimate their distribution.
In our first experiment, our goal is to obtain PF = 0.01 and PD = 0.99. From
(58), we find that we can achieve PF = 0.01 with T = 2.325. Then, to get a rough
estimate of the number of frames required to achieve the desired PD, we first assume
PD has a Gaussian distribution and we calculate d from (32) and we solve (61) to
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obtain a starting point for F . Then, we calculate the correct value of PD from
(60) and if PD is not close to the desired PD, we increase or decrease F until it
is. Note that the difference between the watermarked coefficients from the decoded
video with their values before the watermark was added is not exactly equal to the
quantization step size because the encoding process is lossy. On average this difference
is Q̂ instead of Q, where Q̂ is generally smaller, but close to, Q. Table 20 shows the
standard deviation of the ac coefficients in the video sequence, σ, Q̂, and the number
of iterations, t, that it takes to find the number of watermarked frames, F , to calculate
the detector response for the desired performance. It also shows the total number
of detector responses #ψ, the theoretically computed probability of detection from
(60) that we denote as PDt , and the probabilities of detection, PD, and false alarms,
PF found from Monte Carlo trials. Our results show that PD is close to 0.99 and
PF is close to 0.01. Note that the larger #ψ is, the more exact PD and PF will be.
In Figures 22 and 23, we plot the probability distribution of the detector response
under H0 and H1 for the video sequences carphone and mobile. We have a total of
839 detector responses for carphone and 4949 detector responses for mobile from
coding these video sequences 100 times. The symbols ◦ and ⋄ reflect the number of
detector responses in the intervals centered around them. These figures show that
the experimentally determined p(Ψ|H0) approximates a Gaussian distribution with a
variance of one, however, p(Ψ|H1) no longer has a Gaussian distribution.
Now we show the effect of different attacks on detection performance. We first
consider a 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack. We choose F and the threshold as in
Table 20 to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01. Table 21 gives σ, Q̂, the theoretically
determined PDt from (60), and PD and PF computed from the simulation results.
Table 21 shows that after the Gaussian filtering attack both σ and Q̂ become smaller.
However, the reduction in the value of Q̂ is more significant. Thus, for the same
F as Table 20, p(Ψ|H1) moves towards p(Ψ|H0) because the mean value of ψ under
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Table 20: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF =
0.01 for a location-unaware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ t F #ψ PDt PD PF
carphone 15.18 15.99 13 15 839 0.9935 0.9940 0.0083
claire 14.88 15.68 7 104 159 0.9894 > 0.9937 0.0191
mobile 15.45 29.80 2 2 4949 0.9989 0.9988 0.0123
mother 14.46 11.58 17 55 179 0.9895 0.9888 0.0056
salesman 15.14 13.72 5 26 569 0.9901 0.9877 0.0141
soccer 15.02 13.62 3 3 1633 0.9960 > 0.9993 0.0104
table 15.11 19.53 8 13 761 0.9926 0.9908 0.0158
tempete 15.39 20.79 2 2 2099 0.9982 0.9962 0.0148
Table 21: Experimental results after the 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack when the
target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for a location-unaware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ F PDt PD PF
carphone 10.27 13.88 15 0.9844 0.9774 0.0083
claire 10.39 14.78 104 0.9620 0.9427 0.0191
mobile 9.88 24.91 2 0.9911 0.9808 0.0123
mother 10.56 10.20 55 0.9819 0.9777 0.0056
salesman 10.49 12.19 26 0.9816 0.9684 0.0141
soccer 10.51 12.43 3 0.9838 0.9890 0.0104
table 10.23 15.82 13 0.9918 0.9803 0.0158
tempete 10.54 17.84 2 0.9494 0.9228 0.0148
hypothesis H1 becomes smaller. Since we set the threshold T as before, we still obtain
the same PF , but PD is lower than its value when not under attack. Increasing F
further, we can still achieve PD = 0.99. Suppose that after the Gaussian filtering
attack, Q̂ becomes as small as 10. We use this value to calculate the required F for
each video sequence. Table 22 shows the assumed value for Q̂, the new values of F
that give the desired PD = 0.99, and PD after the 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack.
We also look at a cropping attack. In our experiment, we crop each video frame
to approximately 50% of its original size from the four sides. We assume that the





















Figure 22: Detector response probability distribution of a location-unaware detector
to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for carphone video sequence.
shifting the watermark array on top of each frame. If the detector can detect the
watermark for one specific position of the watermark, then it can conclude that the
watermark exists. The simulation results show that the detection performance even
improves for some video sequences because cropping can increase ρ and therefore a
smaller F suffices to give the desired PD. This usually happens for the video sequences
that have most of their activity in the middle of the frames like claire, mother
and salesman. Since these video sequences have a small ρ (they have little motion
and texture), they required a larger number of frames compared to the rest of the
video sequences to detect the watermark under no attack. Thus, we do not want
to increase F further for these video sequence after a cropping attack. Table 23
shows σ, Q̂, the theoretically determined PDt from (60), and values of PD and PF
from simulation results. In this case, we achieve the desired performance without
increasing F , because most of the watermarked coefficients are in the middle of the
video frames. If the watermark was uniformly distributed, ρ would remain the same





















Figure 23: Detector response probability distribution of a location-unaware detector
to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for mobile video sequence.
no attack to obtain the same detection performance.
Next, we consider the effect of additive white noise. We add white noise of mean
zero and variance 0.001 to each frame of the video sequence. We chose the variance
experimentally so that the noise is visible, but the video is not useless. Table 24 shows
σ, Q̂, the theoretically determined PDt from (60), and values of PD and PF after the
additive white noise attack. The simulations results show that the detector achieves
the desired performance after the additive white noise attack without increasing F .
Finally, we examine the robustness of the proposed algorithm to a requantization
attack. We change the quantization step size from 16 to 26. Table 25 shows σ, Q̂, the
theoretically determined PDt from (60), and values of PD and PF after the requanti-
zation attack. Studying Table 25 shows that Q̂ becomes significantly smaller after the
requantization attack, and this reduction is more significant for those video sequences
that have fewer nonzero quantized ac residuals (less texture and motion). Although
we do not obtain the desired probability of detection PD = 0.99, the probability of
detection is PD = 0.86 on average for these video sequences after changing Q = 16
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Table 22: Experimental results after the 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack with new
values of F when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for a location-
unaware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ F PDt PD PF
carphone 10 13.88 17 0.9929 0.9906 0.0135
claire 10 14.78 137 0.9903 0.9832 0.0081
mobile 10 24.91 2 0.9919 0.9808 0.0123
mother 10 10.20 61 0.9915 0.9938 0.0060
salesman 10 12.19 30 0.9907 0.9899 0.0176
soccer 10 12.43 4 0.9949 0.9975 0.0098
table 10 15.82 13 0.9912 0.9803 0.0158
tempete 10 17.84 4 0.9957 0.9914 0.0148
Table 23: Experimental results after the cropping attack when the target is to
achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for a location-unaware detector.
Sequence σ Q̂ F PDt PD PF
carphone 15.22 16.65 15 0.9809 0.9797 0.0083
claire 15.01 13.79 104 0.9999 > 0.9937 0.0191
mobile 15.41 30.57 2 0.9652 0.9590 0.0123
mother 14.50 9.40 55 0.9992 > 0.9944 0.0056
salesman 15.17 15.56 26 0.9980 > 0.9982 0.0141
soccer 15.01 14.63 3 0.9371 0.9345 0.0104
table 15.12 19.05 13 0.9981 0.9974 0.0158
tempete 15.26 21.80 2 0.8726 0.8642 0.0148
Table 24: Experimental results after the additive white noise attack when the target
is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for a location-unaware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ F PDt PD PF
carphone 15.17 17.79 15 0.9871 0.9845 0.0083
claire 14.76 17.43 104 0.9680 0.9618 0.0191
mobile 15.39 30.78 2 0.9984 0.9986 0.0123
mother 14.45 13.96 55 0.9583 0.9497 0.0056
salesman 15.44 15.79 26 0.9664 0.9701 0.0141
soccer 15.01 15.69 3 0.9912 0.9945 0.0104
table 15.05 20.98 13 0.9848 0.9803 0.0158
tempete 15.37 22.20 2 0.9964 0.9948 0.0148
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Table 25: Experimental results after changing the quantization step size from 16 to
26 when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for a location-unaware
detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ F PDt PD PF
carphone 7.58 15.29 15 0.9625 0.8868 0.0083
claire 5.28 15.20 104 0.7174 0.7389 0.0191
mobile 8.76 28.20 2 0.9900 0.9709 0.0123
mother 3.46 10.84 55 0.7229 0.7039 0.0056
salesman 5.63 12.70 26 0.8405 0.7944 0.0141
soccer 10.31 12.80 3 0.9922 0.9902 0.0104
table 8.89 18.68 13 0.9543 0.9054 0.0158
tempete 8.80 19.47 2 0.9875 0.9381 0.0148
Table 26: Experimental results after changing the quantization step size from 16 to
26 with new values of F when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01 for
a location-unaware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ F PDt PD PF
carphone 7.58 15.29 37 0.9999 0.9941 0.0083
claire 5.28 15.20 538 0.9999 > 0.9666 0.0191
mobile 8.76 28.20 3 0.9987 0.9945 0.0123
mother 3.46 10.84 252 0.9999 > 0.9743 0.0056
salesman 5.63 12.70 90 0.9999 0.9939 0.0141
soccer 10.31 12.80 3 0.9922 0.9902 0.0104
table 8.89 18.68 37 0.9995 0.9945 0.0158
tempete 8.80 19.47 4 0.9998 0.9933 0.0148
to Q = 26. Increasing F further, we can still achieve PD = 0.99. Table 26 shows the
new values of F that give the desired PD = 0.99 after changing the quantization step
size from 16 to 26.
6.2.2 Comparison of Location-Aware and Location-Unaware Detectors
We embedded the watermark in the H.264 reference software version JM10.2 [1] us-
ing our perceptual watermark embedding algorithm in Chapter 3. We used six stan-
dard QCIF video sequences (176 × 144) at the rate of 30 frames per second for our
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simulation. To compare the experimental results with the theoretical framework, a
large number of detector responses is required. Thus, we coded and watermarked
I-frames of every video sequence 80 times by an H.264 encoder with an intra period
of one (group of picture: I B I). Note that the more detector responses we have, the
more smoothly we can estimate their distribution. The H.264 encoder used a fixed
quantization step size Q = 16 for I-frames. On average the difference between the
watermarked coefficients and their values before watermarking is Q̂ instead of Q be-
cause the encoding process is lossy. In this subsection, we detect the watermark from
I-frames of those video sequences using location-aware detector (LAD) and location-
unaware detector (LUD), and we compare the performance of those detectors. Note
that the results for LAD case has been extensively reported in Chapter 4. However,
we summarize those results here for comparison purposes.
The goal of our first experiment is to obtain PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01. We first
consider the LAD case. Solving equations (32) and (33) analytically, these proba-
bilities can be achieved for T = 2.325 and d = 4.65. We detect the watermark by
computing the detector response over Nw watermarked coefficients for each video.
We use the values of Q̂ and σw given in Table 27 to compute Nw from (35). We
calculate PD and PF based on this threshold. The total number of detector responses
obtained from coding each video sequence 80 times, #ψ, the mean value of the detec-
tor response, mψ, PD and PF obtained from our experiments are shown in Table 27.
This table shows that the theoretically chosen value for Nw does lead to the desired
PD = 0.99 and PF = 0.01.
To obtain the same detection performance for the LUD case, we set the threshold
as before; T = 2.325. To roughly estimate the number of frames required to achieve
the desired PD, we first assume PD has a normal Gaussian distribution, we calculate
d from (32) and we solve (61) to obtain a starting point for F . Then, we calculate the
correct value of PD from (60), and if PD is not close to the desired PD, we increase
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Table 27: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF =
0.01 for a location-aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw #ψ mψ PD PF
carphone 14.40 59.17 365 31978 4.68 0.9898 0.0108
claire 13.52 81.73 790 10328 4.67 0.9905 0.0114
mobile 15.37 51.86 246 97432 4.71 0.9917 0.0121
mother 12.91 63.65 526 12086 4.64 0.9877 0.0140
salesman 14.33 54.60 314 44168 4.67 0.9913 0.0109
table 14.95 59.45 342 24912 4.70 0.9920 0.0107
Table 28: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.99 and PF =
0.01 for a location-unaware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ F #ψ PDt PD PF
carphone 14.40 16.06 1 14799 0.9859 0.9817 0.0101
claire 13.52 15.78 3 6399 0.9819 0.9706 0.0123
mobile 15.37 29.85 1 11599 0.9999 0.9999 0.0127
mother 12.91 11.76 1 11599 0.9895 0.9888 0.0110
salesman 14.33 13.88 1 17599 0.9993 0.9985 0.0122
table 14.95 19.47 3 3866 0.9804 0.9889 0.0142
or decrease F until it is. Table 28 shows the standard deviation of the ac coefficients,
σ, the number of frames, F , required to obtain the desired performance, and the
theoretically computed probability of detection from (60) that we denote as PDt, and
the probability of detection, PD, and the probability of false alarms, PF , obtained
from Monte Carlo trials. Our results show that PD is close to 0.99 and PF is close to
0.01.
In the next experiment, the target is to obtain PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001. From
(32) and (33), these probabilities can be achieved with T = 3.09 and d = 6.18. Tables
29 and 30 show the average value of Q̂, σw, Nw, σ, F for the LAD and LUD cases.
Again our results show that PD is close to 0.999 and PF is close to 0.001 for both
detectors. However, comparing the total number of detector responses, #ψ, in Table
27 with Table 28 and Table 29 with Table 30 shows more frequent detector responses
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Table 29: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and
PF = 0.001 for a location-aware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ Nw #ψ mψ PD PF
carphone 14.40 59.17 645 18095 6.21 0.9992 0.0009
claire 13.52 81.73 1395 5848 6.20 0.9995 0.0014
mobile 15.37 51.86 435 55099 6.25 0.9990 0.0014
mother 12.91 63.65 928 6856 6.16 0.9991 0.0015
salesman 14.33 54.60 554 25033 6.20 0.9992 0.0009
table 14.95 59.45 604 14105 6.23 0.9993 0.0016
Table 30: Experimental results when the target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and
PF = 0.001 for a location-unaware detector.
Sequence Q̂ σ F #ψ PDt PD PF
carphone 14.40 16.06 2 7399 0.9990 0.9993 0.0009
claire 13.52 15.78 7 2742 0.9998 0.9989 0.0015
mobile 15.37 29.85 1 11599 0.9999 0.9999 0.0009
mother 12.91 11.76 3 3866 0.9999 > 0.9997 0.0010
salesman 14.33 13.88 2 8799 0.9999 > 0.9998 0.0014
table 14.95 19.47 7 1657 0.9982 0.9988 0.0018
can be obtained when the location of watermark is known.
In Figures 24 and 25, we plot the probability distribution of the detector response
under H0 and H1 for the video sequence carphone for both detectors. Figure 24
shows that for a location-aware detector, the experimentally determined p(Ψ|H0) and
p(Ψ|H1) approximate a normal Gaussian distribution with a variance of one. This
justifies our assumption that the detector response has a normal Gaussian distribu-
tion. Figure 25 shows that for a location-unaware detector, p(Ψ|H0) still has a normal
Gaussian distribution, however, p(Ψ|H1) no longer has a normal Gaussian distribu-
tion. The greater the change in the number of watermarked coefficients from frame
to frame, the further the distribution will be from normal Gaussian.
Finally, we look at the effect of different attacks on detection performance. We





















Figure 24: Detector response probability distribution of a location-aware detector
to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001 for carphone video sequence.
F as in Table 30 and we set the threshold T = 3.09 to obtain PD = 0.999 and
PF = 0.001 without an attack. Table 31 gives Q̂, σw, σ and PD obtained from both
detectors after the Gaussian filtering attack. Comparing Table 31 with Tables 29 and
30 shows that after the Gaussian filtering attack, σw and σ remain approximately the
same, but Q̂ becomes significantly smaller. Thus, if we choose Nw and F as before,
p(Ψ|H1) moves towards p(Ψ|H0) because the mean value of ψ under hypothesis H1,
mψ, becomes smaller. Since we set T as before, we still obtain the desired PF = 0.001,
but PD is lower than 0.999.
Increasing Nw and F further, we can still achieve PD = 0.999. Suppose that
after the Gaussian filtering attack, Q̂ becomes as small as nine, and suppose that the
variance of the video sequences remains the same. We use these values to calculate
the required Nw and F for each video sequence. Table 32 shows the calculated
value for Nw and PD for a location-aware detector. Since we assumed that Q̂ gets
smaller than it actually does and we set the threshold as before, we always have





















Figure 25: Detector response probability distribution of a location-unaware detector
to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001 for carphone video sequence.
experiment. Therefore, the only statement that we can make is that the probability
of missed detection, PM , is smaller than one over the number of detector responses
we computed, and PD is greater than 1 minus this value. Table 32 also shows the
number of frames F required to still achieve PD = 0.999 and the PD obtained from
simulation results for the location-unaware detector.
We also apply a cropping attack by cropping each video frame to approximately
50% of its original size from the four sides. We assume that the detector can determine
how the video is cropped by using either the original video sequence or synchroniza-
tion templates. The simulation results show that the cropping attack does not affect
the detection performance, however, it does affect the number of detector responses
that can be extracted for each video sequence. For a location-aware detector, Nw is
the same as before, however more frames are required to obtain Nw watermarked coef-
ficients. For the location-unaware detector, we need twice as many frames to achieve
the same performance as without an attack assuming that the watermarked coeffi-
cients are uniformly distributed within a frame. Note that the perceptual watermark
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Table 31: Comparison of location-aware and location-unaware detectors after the
3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack when the target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF =
0.001.
LAD LUD
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw PD σ F PD
carphone 10.02 60.12 645 0.9118 13.90 2 0.9751
claire 9.55 81.01 1395 0.9300 14.83 7 0.9847
mobile 9.43 51.92 435 0.8300 24.84 1 0.9919
mother 9.62 65.11 928 0.9400 10.28 3 0.9961
salesman 10.08 54.57 554 0.9380 12.27 2 0.9998
table 9.38 59.59 604 0.8500 15.73 7 0.9958
Table 32: Comparison of location-aware and location-unaware detectors after the
3 × 3 Gaussian filtering attack with new values of Nw and F when the target is to
achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001.
LAD LUD
Sequence Nw #ψ PD F #ψ PD
carphone 1650 6220 > 0.9998 3 4933 0.9980
claire 3149 2511 > 0.9992 11 1745 > 0.9994
mobile 1268 17491 > 0.9999 2 5799 > 0.9998
mother 1910 2848 > 0.9997 4 2899 0.9996
salesman 1405 9546 > 0.9999 2 8799 0.9998
table 1666 4734 > 0.9998 9 1288 > 0.9992
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Table 33: Comparison of location-aware and location-unaware detectors after the
cropping attack when target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001.
LAD LUD
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw PD σ F PD
carphone 14.53 60.54 645 0.9990 16.73 4 0.9962
claire 14.45 80.01 1395 0.9997 13.86 14 > 0.9992
mobile 15.42 49.81 435 0.9997 30.62 2 0.9991
mother 12.77 50.06 928 0.9997 9.51 6 0.9444
salesman 14.87 54.51 554 0.9996 15.77 4 > 0.9994
table 14.92 59.99 604 0.9984 18.96 14 0.9964
embedding algorithm presented in Chapter 3 distribute the watermarked coefficients
more uniformly than the watermark embedding algorithm presented in Chapter 5,
which embeds the watermark in the nonzero quantized ac residuals. Table 33 shows
Nw, F and PD for both detectors. The total number of detector responses in this
table is approximately half of their corresponding values in Table 29 and 30 since the
video sequences have been cropped to approximately 50% of their original size. Note
that we used the QCIF format (176 × 144) for our simulation results, which has one
of the smallest resolutions; the results improve for higher resolution videos.
Finally, we consider the effect of additive white noise. We add white noise of mean
zero and variance 0.001 to each frame of the video sequence. We chose the variance
experimentally so that the noise is visible, but the video is not useless. We choose N
as in Table 29 and F as in Table 30 to obtain PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001. Table 34
shows Q̂, σw, σ, and PD of both detectors after the additive white noise attack. Our
simulation results show that the proposed algorithm is robust to the additive white
noise, N (0, 0.001), attack without increasing Nw and F .
6.3 Conclusion
For some watermark embedding algorithms like when embedding the watermark in
nonzero ac residuals, the location of watermark is lost after the video is decoded.
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Table 34: Comparison of location-aware and location-unaware detectors after the
additive white noise attack when the target is to achieve PD = 0.999 and PF = 0.001.
LAD LUD
Sequence Q̂ σw Nw PD σ F PD
carphone 14.39 59.17 645 0.9989 17.85 2 0.9922
claire 13.26 81.77 1395 0.9988 17.51 7 0.9960
mobile 15.33 51.86 435 0.9991 30.83 1 0.9999
mother 12.84 63.65 928 0.9984 14.09 3 0.9979
salesman 14.32 54.60 554 0.9994 15.93 2 0.9997
table 14.84 54.45 604 0.9990 20.92 7 0.9982
Thus, it is important that the watermark detection algorithm not depend on the exact
location of the watermark signal. In this chapter, we built a theoretical framework for
a watermark detection algorithm based on a likelihood ratio test that does not depend
on the exact location of watermarked coefficients. This framework was used to obtain
video watermark detection with controllable detection performance. We used this
detector to detect the watermark from P-frames of eight standard video sequences
that were embedded with the watermark using our watermark embedding algorithm
presented in Chapter 5. Our simulation results showed that the theoretically chosen
value for F did lead to the desired values of PD and PF in Monte Carlo trials. We
tested the robustness of our proposed algorithm to several common signal processing
attacks such as filtering, 50% cropping, addition of white noise, N (0, 0.001), and a
requantization attack. Our simulation results showed that our proposed algorithm
was robust against these attacks. We also compared the performance of location-
unaware detector with the location-aware detector presented in Chapter 4. While
both detectors could achieve any probability of detection and false alarm, the location-
aware detector could generate detector responses more frequently than the location-




The goal of this dissertation was to present a robust watermarking algorithm for H.264
and to address challenges in compressed-domain video watermarking. In Section 7.1,
we summarize our contributions and in Section 7.2, we suggest avenues for future
study.
7.1 Contributions
Watermarking digital video introduces challenges that are not present when water-
marking digital images. The large amount of data and inherent redundancy between
frames makes video watermarking algorithms susceptible to self-collusion attacks.
The self-collusion attack is one of the most powerful attacks for video. In Chapter
2, we designed a novel low complexity watermarking algorithm that was robust to
self-collusion attacks [38]. The algorithm embedded the watermark in the quantized
ac residuals of the H.264-compressed video. It achieved collusion resistance by em-
bedding the watermark in the same location in similar frames and different locations
in dissimilar frames. The coefficient within a macroblock that holds the watermark
was determined by a key that was specific to that macroblock, but this could require
a long key stream sequence. To avoid this problem, the key was generated using a
public key extracted from features of the macroblock and the copyright owner’s secret
key. It was proposed that the relative difference of the DC coefficients of the 4 × 4
blocks in a macroblock is a robust feature for public key extraction.
The algorithm we proposed in Chapter 2 embedded the watermark in the com-
pressed video, but this algorithm was not robust against several common watermark-
ing attacks besides the self-collusion. The watermark was embedded in and extracted
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from the I-frame quantized ac residuals, so any simple processing, such as filtering
followed by reencoding by an H.264 encoder, changes the intra-macroblock predic-
tion modes, and thus the residuals, which makes watermark recovery impossible. In
Chapter 3, we presented a perceptual watermarking algorithm for H.264 that was
robust to common signal processing attacks [39, 41]. To achieve this goal we em-
bedded the watermark in the residuals to avoid decompressing the video and also to
reduce the complexity of the watermarking algorithm. However, the watermark was
extracted from the decoded video sequence to make the algorithm robust to intra-
prediction mode changes. Since H.264’s high compression performance leaves little
room for an imperceptible signal to be inserted, we employed a human visual model
to increase the payload and add robustness while limiting visual distortion. Watson
et al. derived a model for distortion perception in 8 × 8 DCT blocks [46, 72], and
we extended this human visual model for the 4 × 4 DCT block used in H.264. If all
the coefficients with visual capacity for watermark embedding were used, the visual
quality of the video would be degraded. We proposed embedding the watermark in
a selected subset of the coefficients that have visual watermarking capacity by using
a key-dependent algorithm. This makes the algorithm more robust to malicious at-
tacks. Furthermore, we designed our algorithm so that the watermark is spread over
frequencies and blocks to reduce the error pooling effect described by Watson [72].
In Chapter 4, we presented our video watermark detection algorithm when the
precise location of watermark signal is known to the detector, a detector we call
location aware [41, 42]. We built a theoretical framework for watermark detection
based on a likelihood ratio test and used it to obtain video watermark detection with
controllable detection performance. We detected the watermark by multiplying the
possibly watermarked DCT coefficients of the decoded frame by the original water-
mark bits, calculating the sum of those terms, normalizing the result, and comparing
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the sum against a threshold. We proved that the performance of our watermark de-
tector only depends upon the conditional mean of the detector response under the
hypothesis that the watermark exists in the DCT coefficients. This mean depends
upon three parameters: the average of the squares of the H.264 quantization step
sizes of watermarked DCT coefficients, the standard deviation of watermarked DCT
coefficients, and the number of watermarked DCT coefficients, Nw, over which the
detector response is computed. We cannot control the first two parameters, but we
can control Nw. This is not the case with images, since there is a limited number
of coefficients that can be watermarked in each image before the watermark is vis-
ible. Therefore, our video watermark detection algorithm calculated the number of
watermarked DCT coefficients needed to compute the detector response to obtain the
desired probability of detection, PD for a given probability of a false alarm PF . Our
simulation results showed that the theoretically chosen value for Nw does lead to the
desired PD and PF in Monte Carlo trials. Furthermore, even after watermarking at-
tacks, we can obtain any PD and PF by making a worst case assumption on the first
two parameters and computing Nw accordingly. We used this watermark detector
to detect the watermark from I-frames of six standard video sequences watermarked
with the algorithm presented in Chapter 3. Our simulation results showed that our
watermarking scheme presented in Chapter 3 is robust to 3 × 3 Gaussian filtering,
50% cropping, addition of white noise N (0, 0.001), and a trivial deliberate attack.
In Chapter 5, we explored watermark embedding in P-frames [37, 40]. The chal-
lenge in embedding the watermark in P-frames is that the video bit rate increases
significantly. Thus, we only embedded the watermark in nonzero quantized ac resid-
uals in P-frames. Since these coefficients correspond to non-flat areas that are in
motion, temporal and texture masking were exploited at the same time. We showed
that the number of nonzero quantized ac residuals in each frame resembles the motion
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intensity plots in different video sequences. We also proposed embedding the water-
mark in nonzero quantized ac residuals with spatial masking capacity in I-frames.
Our simulation results showed that the bit rate increase per watermark bit of our al-
gorithm in this chapter is significantly smaller than the previous compressed-domain
video watermarking algorithms [41, 76] when embedding the watermark in both I-
and P- frames.
In some applications, the watermark detector does not know which coefficients are
embedded with the watermark. For example, our watermark embedding algorithm
in Chapter 5 embedded the watermark in the nonzero quantized ac residuals. The
identity of those locations is lost when the video is completely decoded. Furthermore,
a re-encoding or a deliberate attack that inserts additional nonzero coefficients would
cause desynchronization and consequent failure in watermark detection. Thus, for
some applications it is important that the watermark detection algorithm not depend
on the precise location of the watermark signal. In Chapter 6, we proposed a new
variation on the watermark detection algorithm developed in Chapter 4 that does
not depend on where the watermark signal is embedded, called the location-unaware
detector [37, 42]. Our algorithm calculated the number of frames, F , required for the
watermark detector to obtain the desired probability of a detection, PD, for a given
false alarm probability, PF . We used this detector to detect the watermark from
P-frames of eight standard video sequences that were embedded with the watermark
using our watermark embedding algorithm presented in Chapter 5. Our simulation
results showed that the theoretically chosen value for F did lead to the desired values
of PD and PF in Monte Carlo trials. We tested the robustness of our proposed
algorithm to several common signal processing attacks such as filtering, 50% cropping,
addition of white noise N (0, 0.001), and a requantization attack. Our simulation
results showed that our proposed algorithm was robust against these attacks. We
also compared the performance of location-unaware detector with the location-aware
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detector presented in Chapter 4. While both detectors could achieve any probability
of detection and false alarm, the location-aware detector could generate detector
responses more frequently than the location-unaware detector.
7.2 Suggestions for Future Work
There are many avenues for pursuing further work in this area. Some of those avenues
are as follows:
• Exploring how far the Gaussian distribution model is from the optimal gener-
alized Gaussian distribution model.
• Predicting how different attacks will affect Q̂ and the variance of the DCT
coefficients and adjusting the detector accordingly.
• Testing the robustness of the proposed algorithm to more severe attacks such
as changing the video format.
• Exploring the watermarking capacity of chrominance components.
• Developing a watermarking scheme that avoids error propagation in I-frames
when the watermark is embedded in the H.264 bitstream.
• Looking into security measures for watermarking that are similar to what exists
in cryptography. For example, answering the questions: Is it possible to develop
a security framework based on the computational complexity of attacks? Can
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